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I. Introduction
One of the most controversial developments in public education
during the past decade has been the establishment of charter schools.'
By their establishment, charter schools provide families an opportunity to
choose an education for their children in public schools that are
individually chartered and separated from the local public school
2system. This type of choice is especially geared for families who
1. Seymour Sarason has characterized the charter school movement as "the most
radical educational reform effort in the post World War 11 era." SEYMOUR B. SARASON,
CHARTER SCHOOLS: ANOTHER FLAWED EDUCATIONAL REFORM? vii (1998).
2. See Overview of Charter Schools, available at http://www.uscharterschools.org/
pub/uscs docs/o/index.htm. This link provides instructive information concerning the
wide array of charter school facilities, programs, and directing bodies.
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
believe that the traditional public schools are not well suited for their
children but who lack the means to afford private schools or the ability to
relocate to more highly regarded school districts.3  If families are
dissatisfied with the assignment of their children within the traditional
public schools of their local school district, they may seek placement of
their children in available public charter schools, space permitting.
Because the establishment of charter schools constitutes an implicit
criticism of and challenge to the existing public school system, however,
charter school proponents have often encountered fierce resistance from
organized groups associated with traditional public schools.5 These
charter school adversaries have frequently resorted to proactive
countermeasures to prevent charter schools from opening and continuing
operations.6 In doing so, they have repeatedly turned to the legal system
for assistance.7 Among the principal means they have employed to
prevent charter schools from opening and operating have been the filing
of court challenges predicated on alleged violations of state and federal
law. As one legal commentator has aptly noted, "[b]ecause the
stakeholders in the traditional public school system find themselves
3. Parents and teachers choose charter schools primarily for educational reasons-
high academic standards, small class size, innovative approaches, or educational
philosophies in line with their own. Some also have chosen charter schools for their
small size and associated safety (charter schools serve an average of 250 students). Id.
4. Any child in a school district that operates a charter school is eligible to apply
for admission to a charter public school. Admission standards and processes are required
to be fair and open to all; recruitment is required to extend to all segments of a district. If
a waiting list for admission exists, schools generally run a lottery to determine who will
be admitted. So far, the demographics of most charter school reflect that of the district in
which they operate. See Charter School FAQs available at
http://www.uscharterschools.org/pub/uscs-docs/o/faq.html.
5. Some of this organized opposition may be self-serving and protective, especially
when expressed by representatives of school boards and teachers' unions. See, e.g., JOE
NATHAN, CHARTER SCHOOLS: CREATING HOPE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR AMERICAN
EDUCATION (1999). Nevertheless, at least some of the opposition appears to be based on
legitimate concerns that charter schools cannot achieve two of the most widely
acknowledged aspirations of American schooling: quality and equality. See Martha
Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 257 (1999). Minow is the
William Henry Bloomberg Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, as well as a
Professor at the Harvard School of Education. Her research has included the field of
education as well as equality and inequality, human rights, law and social change, and
religion and pluralism. Opposition also appears to be based on disapproval of "the idea
of deregulating public schools for the purpose of trying out unproven teaching methods."
Sheri Williams, State Formation of Charter Schools in Kansas, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
103. (1997).
6. See BRYAN C. HASSEL, THE CHARTER SCHOOL CHALLENGE: AVOIDING THE
PITFALLS, FULFILLING THE PROMISE, 136-37 (1999).
7. Hassel writes, "[i]n the three states with strong laws, districts and/or other
opponents of charter schools have filed lawsuits challenging the charter law or specific
applications of it." Id. at 136.
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under siege to improve the quality of public education, the legal battles
surrounding charter schools are certain to be acrimonious. '8
In pursuing their struggle against charter schools, adversaries have
utilized both state and federal court systems. After typically first
exhausting state administrative forums, many dissatisfied adversaries
have pursued claims in state appellate courts and, in some instances,
have then taken an appeal to their state's supreme court. In other cases,
adversaries have bypassed their state legal system and have filed claims
in federal district court and, sometimes, have then taken an appeal to
their respective federal circuit court of appeals.
In so doing, adversaries have raised a wide variety of legal claims.
Such claims have included state constitutional challenges based on
requirements to provide a thorough and efficient education 9 and
prohibition of an unlawful delegation of power; 10 state statutory
challenges based on eligibility qualifications for the issuance of
charters11 and the criteria of funding formula for distribution of state
aid;12 federal constitutional challenges based on the First Amendment,
3
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; 14 and
federal statutory challenges based on Title VI of the Individuals with
Disabilities in Education Act.1 5  Moreover, the adversaries' proposed
remedies for alleged violations have included orders declaring that state
8. See Karla A. Turekian, Traversing the Minefields of Education Reform: The
Legality of Charter Schools, 29 CONN. L. REv. 1365, 1394 (1997).
9. See infra, Part IV, section A (In the Matter of the Grant of the Charter Sch.
Application of Engelwood on the Palisades Charter Sch., 727 A.2d 15 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1999) affd. as modified by 753 A.2d 687 (2000)).
10. See infra, Part IV, section A (Council of Org. and Others for Educ. About
Parochiad v. Governor, 556 N.W.2d 208 (1997); Bd. of Educ.in the Denver Sch. Dist. v.
Booth, 984 P.2d 639 (Colo. 1999); Utah Sch. Bd. Ass'n v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 17
P.3d 1125 (Utah 2001); Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 (1999)).
11. See infra, Part IV, section B (West Chester Area Sch. Dist. v. Collegium Charter
Sch., 812 A.2d 1172 (Pa. 2002); Brackbill v. Ron Brown Charter Sch., 777 A.2d 131 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2001); Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Independence Charter Sch., 774 A.2d 798 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2001); Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. of City of York v. Lincoln-Edison
Charter Sch., Inc., 785 A.2d 180 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001); Souderton Area Sch. Dist. v.
Souderton Charter Sch. Collaborative, 764 A.2d 688, (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000); Shenango
Valley Regional Charter Sch. v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. and Sharon City Sch. Dist., 756
A.2d 1191, (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000)).
12. See infra, Part IV, section B (In the Matter of the Grant of the Charter Sch.
Application of the Red Bank Charter Sch. Ass'n, No. A-4725-97T1 (N.J. App. Div.
1999); In the Matter of the Grant of the Charter Sch. Application of the Patrick Douglas
Charter Sch., No. A-4713-97T1 (N.J. App. Div. 1999)).
13. See, e.g., Daugherty v. Vanguard Charter Sch. Acad., 116 F. Supp. 2d 897 (D.
Mich. 2000); Porta v. Klagholz, 19 F. Supp. 2d 290 (D.N.J. 1998).
14. See, e.g., Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481 (10th Cir. 1996); Perry v.
Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 12 Fed. Appx. 406, 2001 WL 690653 (7th Cir. 2001); Omegbu v.
Norquiest, 20 Fed. Appx. 561, 2001 WL 1231382 (7th Cir. 2001).
15. See, e.g., Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F. 3d 481 (10th Cir. 1996).
20041
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
charter school programs be abolished on grounds that their enabling acts
are unconstitutional,16 that funding for charter schools be terminated
because the methods for obtaining revenue are impermissible, 7 and that
individual charter schools be suspended or closed for failure to comply
with mandatory statutes.' 8
Given the potential far-reaching impacts of legal challenges to
charter schools, this article attempts to analyze the full range and
outcomes of those challenges that have occurred between 1992 and 2002,
the first decade of charter school operations.' 9 It does so by reviewing
all of the published state and federal case law on this topic, and then
analyzes that case law on an issue-by-issue basis.
20
Such an analysis may prove beneficial to both proponents as well as
adversaries of charter schools. As one legal commentator has aptly
observed, the rush to create charter school legislation before many of the
legal ramifications have been understood has produced a climate of
uncertainty, which in turn has produced a breeding ground for ensuing
litigation. 21 A second commentator has emphasized that "there is a
pressing need to provide state policymakers with current, comprehensive
information so that they, in turn, can design legislation and implement
regulations that are definitive and defensible.
22
Unfortunately, policymakers have sometimes failed to appreciate
the ramifications of their charter school enabling acts, especially the
ways in which they may conflict with goals mandated by state
constitutions 23 and federal law. 24 Thus the charting of legal challenges to
charter schools in the state and federal courts, as presented here, may
16. See infra, Part IV, section A (Council of Orgs. and Others for Educ. About
Parochiad v. Governor, 556 N.W.2d 208 (1997)).
17. See infra, Part IV, section A (Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ., 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 745
(1999); In the Matter of the Grant of the Charter Sch. Application of Engelwood on the
Palisades Charter Sch., 753 A.2d 687 (2000).
18. See infra note 68, and accompanying text.
19. The first charter school was opened in Minnesota in 1992. By 2002, there were
nearly 2700 charter schools operating in thirty-six states and the District of Columbia.
See Center for Education Reform, available at
http://edreform.com/press/2002/charternumbers.htm.
20. Much of the analysis in this article is derived from research performed for an
Ed.D. Dissertation at Teachers College, Columbia University, entitled A Regulatory
Analysis, Case Law Analysis, and Limited Program Review of New Jersey's Charter
School Program (approved May 2003).
21. See Jennifer T. Wall, The Establishment of Charter Schools: A Guide to Legal
Issues for Legislators, 1998 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 69 (1998).
22. Frank R. Kemerer, The Legal Status of Privatization and Vouchers in Education,
in PRIVATIZING EDUCATION: CAN THE MARKETPLACE DELIVER CHOICE, EFFICIENCY,
EQUITY, AND SOCIAL COHESION? 55 (Henry M. Levin ed., 2001).
23. See infra Part IV, section A.
24. See infra Part V.
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provide a general roadmap to policymakers as well as school officials to
help guide them through relatively unexplored legal terrain so that they
may be more fully cognizant of potential pitfalls.
II. Previous Commentary on Court Challenges to Charter Schools
During the first decade of the charter school movement, numerous
legal scholars have written commentary identifying the types of court
challenges that might prove problematic for the charter school movement
in general and to individual charter schools. Because at the time of this
writing only a relatively small number of charter schools had
commenced operations, most previous legal commentary has been
predictive in format, rather than based-as this article -on the outcomes
of actual litigation. Nevertheless, the views of many of these legal
scholars are worth noting, since they provide insight into some of the
most widely held concerns on the potential negative impact resulting
from charter school expansion. 25 Their commentary has generally been
thematic, dealing with specific legal issues, and predicated on either state
law or federal law. Accordingly, in this section I present a brief review
of the major themes and related issues that their commentary has
identified.
A. Previous Commentary on Court Challenges Based on State Law
Legal observers have produced a steady outpouring of commentary
concerning challenges to charter schools based on state law in general
and the law of particular states. Not surprisingly, most of this
commentary has focused on those states with the longest existing charter
school programs and those states-frequently the same-that have
generated the most litigation.
The first major topic that commentators have identified as a
potential source of problems for charter schools is the constitutional issue
of control. States may be limited as to the amount of control that they
can accord to their charter schools due to restrictive language contained• 26
in the educational provisions of their state constitutions. These
25. For example, Jay Heubert has voiced serious concern as to whether charter
schools may be able to function effectively and still serve the needs of students with
disabilities as mandated by federal statutes and regulations. See Jay Heubert, Schools
Without Rules? Charter Schools, Federal Disability Law, and the Paradoxes of
Deregulation, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301 (1997).
26. See Kemerer, supra note 22, at 40; Wall, supra note 21, at 71; L.K. Beale,
Charter Schools, Common Schools, and the Washington State Constitution, 72 WASH. L.
REV. 535 (1997); Peter J. Perla, The Colorado Charter School Act and the Potential for
Unconstitutional Applications Under Article IX, § 15 of the State Constitution, 67 U.
COLO. L. REv. 171 (1996); Andrew Broy, Charter Schools and Education Reform: How
2004]
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constitutional provisions may require a certain degree of state
supervision-an amount that effectively prohibits charter schools from
operating too independently from the state-run system. Although the
reach of these constitutional provisions is limited solely to statewide
application, Frank Kemerer has observed that decisions handed down in
one state-especially when rendered by its supreme court-may
subsequently be deemed to have persuasive value to other states with
similar constitutional provisions.27
Several legal commentators, such Karla Turekian, 28  have
emphasized this point by referencing Council of Organizations and
Others for Education About Parochiad v. Governor,29 a 1997 decision
rendered by the Supreme Court of Michigan. This case involved a
general challenge to Michigan's charter school enabling act and was
premised on the contention that the act was unconstitutional because the
"public academies" created pursuant to the act were not sufficiently
within state control.30 The plaintiffs also contended that the academies'
governing boards were not public entities as required by the constitution
because board members were not publicly elected.3' In ruling against the
challenge, the Michigan Supreme Court became the first of the states'
highest courts to uphold a charter school law. The court determined that
the act provided sufficient public accountability by means of the charter
granting and monitoring process.32 The court took judicial notice that,
during the course of the litigation, the Michigan legislature had amended
the original enabling act to restrain the autonomy of public academies by
making them subject to the rule-making authority of the state board of
education.33
Legal commentators have maintained that the basic constitutional
argument presented in this and similar cases-an alleged misallocation
of control-could be utilized as the basis for constitutional challenges in
other states to thwart the continuation of charter school programs and
State Constitutional Challenges Will Alter Charter School Legislation, 79 N.C.L. REV.
493 (2001). It should be observed that all fifty states have an educational provision
within their state constitutions. A complete collection of those provisions is set forth in
Appendix C of KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL
LAW 978 (5th ed. 2001).
27. Kemerer has written extensively on this subject. See, e.g., Frank Kemerer, State
Constitutions and School Vouchers, 120 ED. LAW REP. 1 (1997); Frank Kemerer, The
Constitutional Dimension of School Vouchers, 3 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 137 (1998).
28. Turekian, supra note 8.
29. 556 N.W.2d 208.
30. Id. at 216.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 221.
33. Id. at 213.
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activities.34 Peter Perla, for example, has suggested that the Colorado
charter school act violated the provision within the state constitution that
vested control of public education in local boards of education.35 L. K.
Beale has asserted that charter schools established under the enabling act
in Washington state lacked the overall characteristics of a "common
school" and, therefore, were not entitled to receive public funding. 36 He
claims that the character and ideology of these charter schools violates
the uniform system mandated by Washington's state constitution.37
Moreover, Kemerer has contended that educational provisions in
certain state constitutions could mean that some charter school enabling
legislation gives rise to unconstitutional delegations of authority.38 If a
state constitution requires that public schools be controlled by public
officials, plaintiffs could use that requirement as a basis for challenging
officials' hiring of private contractors to perform certain instructional
services, especially management functions to groups such as the Edison
Project.39
In further discussing the issue of control, Wall has noted that states
with strong charter school enabling acts have tended to permit their
charter schools to be largely legally autonomous. 40  But when such a
state's constitution contains a provision vesting supervision of education
in the state board of education, the issue of control can assume
constitutional dimensions.4' Wall maintains that legislatures may be able
to avoid having their enabling acts declared unconstitutional by
employing careful drafting, provided they ensure that overall control
remains with the state authority and is not delegated to a local school
board or charter school.42 Along with Huffnan, Wall recommends that
34. Turekian has asserted that the Michigan case brought "to the forefront the
question of what constitutes adequate accountability to the taxpaying public that provides
the funds for the organization and operation of charter schools." Turekian, supra note 8,
at 1382. This important issue of accountability may have to be resolved differently in the
individual states, depending on their determination of how their constitutional system of
control is allocated and administered.
35. See Perla, supra note 26. See also, COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 15 which provides
that "directors [of the local boards of education] shall have control of instruction in the
public schools of their respective districts."
36. Beale, supra note 26, at 565.
37. Id. at 566.
38. See Kemerer, supra note 22, at 41.
39. This issue is of special concern to states such as New Jersey, in which several
for-profit organizations (including the Edison Project) have become increasingly
involved in the management of New Jersey charter schools.
40. Wall examined the enabling legislation in twelve states, contrasting six states
that have granted relatively broad autonomy and six that have granted limited autonomy.
Wall, supra note 21.
41. Id. at 71.
42. In addition to cautioning about potential state constitutional problems,
2004]
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the scope of state control should include accountability and evaluation.43
These writers argue that the states must assume responsibility for
monitoring the quality of education and must take appropriate remedial
44action, should it prove necessary.
Legal commentators have also noted that a related constitutional
problem involving state control of charter schools could arise because of
a state's statutory classification of charter schools. 45 State legislatures
have chosen to classify charter schools variously as public schools, as
non-profit organizations, and as school districts. These characterizations
are the product of efforts of state legislatures to classify the schools so
that they can exist both legally and functionally and receive certain
46benefits, such as state funding. But, as Kemerer has cautioned,
statutory classification of charter schools may not provide sufficient
constitutional cover; charter schools must, in fact, function as public
schools in order to survive a constitutional challenge.47 To ensure
commentators have noted that a state program in which a substantial amount of control is
delegated to local school districts may be ineffective as a practical matter due to the
degree of delegation. Williams argued that the Kansas charter school approval process
delegated too much power to the local school districts, thus threatening the future success
of the charter movement within that state. The approval process requires that local
school districts approve charter schools, that the statewide amount of charter schools be
limited to fifteen and the amount in individual districts be limited to two, that the charter
school validity period be restricted to three years, and that charter school teachers be
certified unless their school has secured a waiver. See Williams, supra note 5. See also
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1903 (2002). I have not emphasized this point about delegation in
this article because New Jersey does not give its local school districts control over charter
schools.
43. See Wall, supra note 21, and Kevin S. Huffman, Charter Schools, Equal
Protection Litigation, and the New School Reform Movement, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1290
(1998). It should be noted that some charter school proponents contend that states should
exempt charter schools from complying with the more specific curricula and high stakes
testing associated with the increasingly popular "standards" movement. These standards
are said to drive instruction in ways that (by design) constrain what schools can do, thus
limiting experimentation and innovation. Nevertheless, it seems questionable for state
policymakers to permit charter schools to decline evaluation with respect to the same
standards required in other public schools. Policymakers in some states have resolved the
question by requiring all charter school students to take the same mandatory assessments
as other public school students. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-16(e)(5) (2002).
44. See Wall, supra note 21.
45. Wall writes that "[t]o avoid potential legal problems relating to issues of control,
drafters of charter legislation need to make charter schools part of the public education
system, both in the language of the legislation and in the substance of the statutory
scheme. Drafters must also make it clear in the legislation, by express language and in
substance, that charter schools fall under the supervision and general control of the state
board of education (or other constitutionally mandated body vested with the authority to
supervise and control public education)." Wall, supra note 21, at 76.
46. Id. at 75.
47. Kemerer writes that a "carefully drafted privatization statute that spells out the
conditions of contracting-out, the status of the school operated by the entity, the rights of
students and teachers in the school, and the role of the teachers' union will go a long way
[Vol. 109:1
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constitutionality, legislatures should make clear-through express
language in their enabling acts and in the context of their statutory
scheme-that charter schools fall clearly under the supervision and
control of the state board of education.
Kemerer has further noted that each state's resolution of the
contentious issue of whether religious organizations can operate charter
schools depends upon the particular state's constitution.48  "In states
where private organizations are not precluded from obtaining a charter,
the answer appears to be yes," provided that the charter school is
operated as a public school.49 Other commentators suggest that this issue
might also present First Amendment Free Exercise or Establishment
Clause challenges. 50
In addition to these potential constitutional challenges,
commentators have also identified at least three key statutory areas in
which state charter school programs may face serious legal problems.
One such area includes the related issues of liability, immunity and
insurance protection. Wall has contended that many states, in their
eagerness to enact charter schools programs, have only dealt with these
concerns incompletely. 5' Citing Kevin McJessy's article, 52 Wall asserts
that charter schools are "clearly vulnerable" to liability under contract
theories including breach of express contract, promissory estoppel, and
students' third party beneficiary claims.53
Some states such as California have simply ignored liability
concerns in their charter school regulatory schemes.5 4 Other states have
attempted to resolve liability concerns by granting partial or total
immunity to school district governing boards and other sponsors of
toward mitigating conflict and forestalling litigation." Kemerer, supra note 22, at 43.
48. He cites the Michigan charter school statute at issue in Council of Orgs. and
Others for Educ. About Parochiad v. Governor, 556 N.W. 2d 208 (Mich. 1997) which
prohibits grants to religious organizations.
49. Kemerer, supra note 22, at 43.
50. See generally Toby Heytens, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L.
REV. 117 (2000). One should note, however, that the United States Supreme Court has in
recent cases "departed from the rule . . . that all government aid that directly assists the
educational function of religious schools is invalid." Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
225 (1997).
51. This is especially true of the issue of liability. See Wall, supra note 21, at 86.
52. Kevin P. McJessy, Contract Law: The Proper Framework for Litigating
Educational Liability Claims, 89 N.W. U. L. REV. 1768 (1995).
53. Wall, supra note 21, at 100.
54. Wall notes that, while the California legislature's ignoring liability issues is
troubling, "[t]he statute does, however, provide that 'the governing board may require
that the petitioner or petitioners provide information regarding the proposed operation
and potential effects of the school, including, but not limited to, the ... potential civil
liability effects upon the school and upon the school district."' Id. at 90 (citing CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 47605(g) (West Supp. 1998)).
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individual charter schools.55 In Arizona, for example, the legislature has
immunized charter school personnel from liability for acts done in good
faith falling within the scope of their authority.56 In Massachusetts the
legislature has granted general governmental immunity to charter schools
and extended tort immunity to officials operating the schools. 57 In less
forgiving states, such as New Jersey, the legislature has permitted charter
schools to "sue and be sued, but only to the same extent and upon the
same conditions that a public entity can be sued.' '58 Regardless of the
precise formulation of the statute, Wall recommends that states should
include mandatory provisions to allocate responsibility among potential
defendants and to establish definitively the extent to which charter
schools may be granted immunity.59
A second statutory area which may give rise to serious legal
problems for charter schools includes state laws designed for the
protection of employees' collective bargaining rights.6° It is not always
clear whether those laws would cover charter school teachers and other
employees, which coverage would permit them the right to bargain
collectively should they choose to do so. 61 Because the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) does not apply to public sector employees,
62
disputes about collective bargaining must be resolved primarily based on
55. See Wall, supra note 21.
56. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-183(P) (2003) which reads: "A sponsor other
than a school district governing board, including members, officers and employees of the
sponsor, are immune from personal liability for all acts done and actions taken in good
faith within the scope of their authority during duly constituted regular and special
meetings." One should note that this constitutes a subjective standard, rather than a
reasonableness test or other type of objective standard. As such, it tends to permit
individuals wide latitude for error and mistakes in judgment because bad faith is often
difficult to prove.
57. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 89(z)(aa) (2003).
58. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-6(b) (2003). To ensure that both charter school
personnel and the public have been adequately protected, the New Jersey legislature has
required charter school trustees to acquire insurance. New Jersey's enabling act states
that the board of trustees "shall provide for appropriate insurance against any loss or
damage to its property or any liability resulting from the use of its property or from the
acts or omissions of its officers and employees." See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-14(a)
(2003).
59. See Wall, supra note 21, at 84.
60. See William G. Buss, Teachers, Teacher's Unions, and School Choice, in
SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAw 310 (Steven D.
Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999).
61. Id. Not surprisingly, the school boards of charter schools might seek to avoid
having to negotiate with a teachers' union, which would presumably be inclined to fight
for similar terms and conditions of employment as enjoyed by its members in public
school districts. For a detailed review of those rights, see CHARLES J. Russo, REUTTER'S
THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 585-601 (5th ed. 2004).
62. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(2) (2003).
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interpretations of state labor laws.63  Currently, forty-one of the fifty
states permit collective bargaining for public employees.64 In these
states, the teachers' unions have consistently opposed initiatives they
view as impeding their ability to represent public school employees.
65
The unions have not hesitated to use the courts to pursue their objectives.
Kemerer maintains that the outcome of many of the legal challenges
brought by teachers' unions may turn on the specific relationship of
charter schools to their local school districts, and on the extent to which
charter schools are controlled by non-profit or for-profit entities.66
Kemerer references a 1997 lawsuit brought against a Minnesota charter
school as an illustration.67 The Duluth Federation of Teachers alleged
that the teachers who worked at a for-profit charter school operated by
the Edison Project should have been included in the local school
district's collective bargaining unit.68 A state court, however, held that
under the state's enabling act such charter school employees had the
option to bargain separately or not at all. It therefore determined that the
teachers could remain in a non-union status if they so chose.69
The third major statutory area that legal scholars have predicted
might cause serious legal problems for charter schools includes problems
related to revocation. Commentators such as Wall caution that state's
decision to revoke a charter school's license and force it to close could
have a devastating impact on the school's students and staff, unless the
state has first enacted appropriate statutory safeguards. 70 The hardships
63. In some states that permit private schools to function as charter schools or
otherwise permit them to provide services for public schools, such schools continue to be
deemed private employers under state labor relation's law. See, e.g., Lee Acad. Educ.
Ass'n v. Acad., 556 A.2d 218 (Me. 1989). Most states, however, do not permit private
schools to serve as charter schools.
64. It should be noted that these states may also have laws covering private sector
collective bargaining that could impact personnel employed at charter schools. Although
state law cannot supersede federal law, the NLRA does not cover all private sector
employees. Specifically, the NLRA does not apply to employees at very small
organizations, to teachers at sectarian schools, and to teachers who function as
managerial employees. Thus state private sector labor laws could conceivably fill in
these gaps, affording coverage to such employees.
65. See Buss, supra note 60, at 303.
66. See Kemerer, supra note 22, at 46-48.
67. Kemerer writes that the suit passed through both the Minnesota state mediation
agency and a state district court but provides no citation of the case. The case was likely
disposed of in an unpublished opinion.
68. See Kemerer, supra note 22, at 46.
69. Id.
70. Although she does not cover the matter in depth, Wall does observe that legal
issues could also arise if a charter school were to decide to object to an order to close
issued by a state or local agency. To minimize litigation, she suggests that state statutes
set forth specific grounds for revocation. "The grounds are essentially four-fold: 1) a
material violation of provisions of the charter; 2) a failure to meet or make reasonable
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could be particularly acute if a charter school has been operating
independently of the local school district and the subsequent closing
occurs during mid-year. "Districts may have to scramble to fit the
students into their schools, money may not be available to provide
necessary room and resources, and openings may not be available for
mid-year employment. ' '71  Wall therefore has recommended that the
supervisory state agency assume the logistical task-following the
closing of a charter school-to bring its students (and possibly its
teachers) into traditional school districts. 2 She asserts that this action
should be taken even if it means placing students in classes that are
already full.73 Consequently, Wall suggests that state legislatures ease
the transition by authorizing the transfer of any remaining funds that
were originally allocated for the (now) closed charter schools to the
school districts that have absorbed their displaced students.74
B. Previous Commentary on Legal Challenges Based on Federal Law
Numerous legal observers have also produced commentary that
analyzes how federal law has or could affect the expansion and direction
of the charter school movement. A review of the commentary pertaining
to constitutional law indicates that most of the attention has focused on
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
As a preliminary step in addressing the impact of either amendment
on charter schools, several commentators, including Jason Wren,75
Robert O'Neill, 76 and Karla Turekian,77 have raised the threshold issue as
to how the "state action doctrine" may come into play. They emphasize
that, without" state action (a legal determination as to whether schools are
"sufficiently imbued with a government quality or nexus"),78 the force of
these constitutional safeguards may not extend to non-traditional public
progress toward the educational objectives contained in the charter; 3) a failure to comply
with fiscal accountability procedures or generally accepted standards of fiscal
management; or 4) a violation of any laws that have not been expressly waived or
exempted by the charter." Wall, supra note 21, at 92.
71. Id. at 94.
72. Id. at 94-97.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Jason Lance Wren, Note: Charter Schools: Public or Private? An Application of
the Fourteenth Amendment's State Action Doctrine to these Innovative Schools, 19 REV.
LITIG. 135 (2000).
76. Robert O'Neil, School Choice and State Action, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL
CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAW 215 (Steven D. Sugarman & Frank R.
Kemerer eds., 1999).
77. Turekian, supra note 8, at 1394.
78. O'Neil, supra note 76, at 215.
[Vol. 109:1
CHARTING THE COURT CHALLENGES
schools such as charter schools.7 9  Observers have acknowledged,
however, that most charter school programs do fall within the scope of
state action, since most states have specifically designated their charters
schools to be public in that they must remain open to all students and be
non-sectarian, tuition-free, and paid for by public financing.80
One reason that states have decided to restrict their charter school
programs in this manner is because of conditions that the federal
government has imposed. In order to obtain available federal funding for
charter schools, states must comply with the federal "definition" of a
charter school.8 1 A primary component of that definition is that a charter
school be "nonsectarian in its programs, admissions policies,
employment practices, and all other operations, and [not] affiliated with a
sectarian school or religious institution.'
82
To the extent that states maintain charter school programs that are
strictly non-sectarian, their charter schools must not conflict with First
Amendment religious restrictions. Jesse Choper 83 and other scholars
have explained that the major source of First Amendment controversy
has centered on the extent to which church-related schools can be
included in school choice programs. 84  In recent years there has been
increased litigation as to whether the inclusion of sectarian schools
would violate the Establishment Clause and its affiliated doctrine
79. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (The concept of state action derives
from the language of the Fourteenth Amendment: "No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States ... "
Because of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence extending that amendment's Due Process
Clause to the First Amendment, the requirement of state action also applies to matters
implicating the First Amendment as well as the Fourteenth Amendment). See Fiske v.
Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). It should be noted that the concept of state action is not
confined merely to the state itself, but also covers the actions of state subdivisions, such
as school districts and individual public schools, including charter schools.
80. See supra note 75, at 166. Wren has asserted, however, that if there is
substantial charter school autonomy, lack of regulation, and private control, ownership or
operation of charter schools, then "a finding that [charter] schools are private actors can
easily be justified."
81. See The Strengthening and Improvement of Elementary and Secondary Schools
Act 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-8962 (2003) (Ensuring that all children have a fair, equal, and
significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at a minimum,
proficiency on challenging state academic achievement standards and state academic
assessments).
82. Id.
83. See Jesse H. Choper, Federal Constitutional Issues, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND
SOCIAL CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAW 235 (Steven D. Sugarman & Frank R.
Kemerer eds., 1999).
84. See, e.g., Stark v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 640, 938 F. Supp. 544 (D. Minn.
1996); rev'd 123 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 1997). It should be noted that in those states that
permit charter schools to be operated by church-related organizations, there have been
several challenges based on alleged violations of the Establishment Clause.
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pertaining to the separation of church and state.8 5  Such litigation has
focused primarily on programs associated with vouchers8 6 and does not
appear to affect directly the operation of charter schools in most states,
since they have previously consented to comply with the federal
requirement of non-sectarianism.
8 7
Legal commentators have also indicated that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not appear to provide a profitable means by which
adversaries may succeed in challenging charter school practices. At least
one has suggested that courts are likely to accord charter schools the
same deferential treatment as they do to traditional public schools.88 In
those challenges alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause, courts presumably would apply a "rational
relationship" analysis. 8 9 The Supreme Court has previously determined
that most educational challenges deserve only this minimal level of
scrutiny because the Court has not deemed education to be a fundamental
right embodied in the United States Constitution.9" Moreover, the
Supreme Court has also ruled that plaintiffs must establish that an
alleged act of discrimination was intentional, as opposed to having
caused simply a disproportionate impact on a suspect class of historically
disadvantaged persons. 91 With such difficult obstacles placed on
potential plaintiffs, charter school programs should probably be able to
survive most Equal Protection challenges.
92
85. Choper, supra note 83, at 259. Choper asserts that answers regarding the
question as to the allowable limitations that can be placed on school choice programs
without violation of the Establishment Clause "cannot be stated with any real certainty."
The Supreme Court, however, seems to be definitely leaning toward a less restrictive
approach. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000), wherein the Court cleanly
broke from previous decisions that had prohibited the allocation of sectarian schools with
public funding.
86. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
87. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-8962, supra note 81. Given current jurisprudential
trends, however, it is conceivable that the Supreme Court could eventually determine that
religious schools must be included as part of any state educational program-based on an
expanded interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause (the other religious clause contained
in the First Amendment). Such a holding would presumably negate a state's ability to
preclude religious schools as part of their charter school program.
88. See Huffman, supra note 43.
89. Id. at 1305.
90. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). If the Court
were to decide that education was a fundamental right, it would require strict scrutiny
analysis rather than minimum scrutiny. In doing so, it would presumably require the state
to show a compelling state interest as to why a suspect program should be permitted,
assuming that program was not equally available to a particular group of suspect students.
See also 411 U.S. 959 (1973) (denying petition for rehearing); Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982) (illustrating how greater scrutiny could favor students in their challenge to the
operation of public school programs).
91. See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pa., 458 U.S. 375 (1982).
92. See Turekian, supra note 8, at 1383-84. This assumes that the challenges are not
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Alternatively, several commentators have suggested that challengers
may have more success in discriminatory claims against charter schools
by utilizing federal statutory provisions, particularly Title VI of the Civil
Right Act of 1964 and Title IX (20 U.S.C.A., § 1681). 9" Title VI outlaws
discrimination on the basis of race, color or nationality in any federally
funded programs, and Title IX provides similar protection on the basis of
gender.94  To establish such a claim, plaintiffs do not have to prove
intentional discrimination in order to prevail, but can establish a prima
facie case by demonstrating a discriminatory effect on their ability to
participate in programs offered by public institutions such as charter
schools.9 5 Nevertheless, the relatively recent Supreme Court holding in
Alexander v. Sandova9 6 appears to have eliminated the right of private
individuals-such as charter school adversaries-to bring Title VI claims
based on alleged disparate impact.97 Thus, unless Congress overturns the
Court's statutory interpretation (which appears unlikely in the
foreseeable future given the current make-up of Congress), there
presumably will not be successful litigation based on the "effects" theory
pertaining to Title VI and the similar theory pertaining to Title IX.98
Because the choices of legal remedies may be severely restricted for
those alleging discriminatory practices on the part of charter schools,
several legal scholars have strongly urged state policymakers to ensure
that issues affecting equal educational opportunities for historically
disadvantaged students be specifically addressed within the framework
based on an alleged infringement of rights of persons whom the Supreme Court has
deemed to fall within a "suspect classification," including persons comprising a
historically disadvantaged race or gender.
93. Id; see also, Stuart Biegel, School Choice Policy and Title VI: Maximizing Equal
Access for K-12 Students in a Substantially Deregulated Educational Environment, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 1533, 1545-46 (1995).
94. See Biegel, supra note 93, at 1544-48.
95. Id. at 1563. Under the established procedure (adapted from Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 jurisprudence), in order to make out a prima facie case, plaintiffs
must establish that a practice bars a disproportionate percentage of a protected class from
a certain benefit. A defendant can justify such an action by the affirmative defense of
educational necessity by proving that the practice is "demonstrably necessary to meet an
important educational goal" and bears a "manifest and demonstrable relationship to
classroom education". Plaintiffs, however, can still prevail by showing the existence of
less discriminatory alternatives to the challenged practice. Plaintiffs must also prove
causation by demonstrating a direct causal link between a given practice and the alleged
disparate impact.
96. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
97. Id. at 1535. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, opined that "as far as we can
tell, Congress did not intend the private right of action under Title VI to encompass the
discriminatory impact regulations."
98. Id. Despite the Court's holding, it still remains permissible for the United States
itself to bring a Title VI "effects" case against a charter school program, but this
potentiality does not appear likely to occur during the current presidential administration.
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of their charter school programs. 99 Martha Minow has voiced concern
that recently enacted charter school initiatives may otherwise foster
neglect or abandonment of the goals that were the cornerstone of the
"last wave" of school reforms emanating from Brown v. Board of
Education °° and subsequent federal civil rights litigation and
legislation.101
In her commentary Minow discusses how this earlier reform
movement used schools as an appropriate and necessary forum to attack
patterns of inequality, discrimination and segregation. 10 2 In addition to
their efforts to promote educational opportunities through integrated
settings for minority students, reformers subsequently took up the
struggle to enhance educational opportunities for other students,
particularly students of low socio-economic status, female students,
students with disabilities, and students with limited English
proficiency.' 03
Minow emphasizes that "legal rights and remedies became the
levers for change."' 0 4 She points out, however, that the federal courts
generally found no legal basis, in the absence of demonstrable harm from
prior race discrimination, to impose remedies solely addressing
inequities of educational opportunity. 10 5 Yet, despite the inadequacies of
previous efforts to promote equality, Minow maintains that they should
not be abandoned. She observes that "each of the equality efforts has
advanced a vision of an inclusive society, capable of and committed to
redressing exclusions and the widespread mistreatment of people due to
reasons beyond their control."
1 0
6
These efforts were indeed part of a larger public mission of forging
commonality, fostering civic engagement in a diverse society, and
offering quality educational opportunities on an equal basis. 10 7 Minow
argues that educators must continue to pursue this mission, even as new
reformers pursue their own vision of a better educational system through
charter schools and other choice proposals.'0 8
Thus, Minow insists that it is imperative to build on-or, as she
99. See Minow, supra note 5. See also Betsy Levin, Race and School Choice, in
SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAW 266 (Steven D.
Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999).
100. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
101. See Minow, supra note 5, at 267.
102. Id. at 272.
103. Id. at 273.
104. Id. at 272.
105. Id. at 275.
106. Id. at 280.
107. Id. at 282.
108. Id. at 285
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expresses it, to further reform-past school reform, rather than simply
replace it and start from scratch.' °9 She is fearful that leaders of the
choice movement may decide to dismiss prior reform efforts and to
promote equity only indirectly."0  She cautions that the new "reforms"
may forego the ideal of common, public institutions because the reforms
"are premised on self-segregation and sorting, and they encourage
competitors to slice off sectors, to skim for excellence, to celebrate
competition over dialogue, and exit over debate.""'
Minow predicts that those within the education community who are
still committed to promoting equity will pursue legal challenges, if
necessary, to preserve and protect existing rights." 2 Through litigation
or other means, they will seek to ensure that the bureaucratic freedom
that legislatures have accorded charter schools does not include the
ability to ignore laws designed to combat discrimination against groups
identified in terms of race, class, gender, disability, language and
religion. 113
Minow acknowledges, however, that judicial decisions are not the
best means of providing such assurance because they are too remote and
indirect." 4 Alternatively, she proposes that advocates of equity should
strive to make certain that newly adopted legislation includes appropriate
restrictions and guidelines." 
5
Another noted legal scholar, Betsy Levin, has in essence taken the
same position as Minow, expressing concern that school choice options
such as charter schools "will lead to increased racial and economic
isolation."' '16 Like Minow, she has suggested that the best means of
minimizing this potential problem is through carefully crafted
legislation.' 17
Several additional commentators have emphasized in particular that
charter school programs may violate federal laws providing protections
for students with disabilities." 8  These commentators appear in
109. Id. at 287.
110. Id. at 282.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 283.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 284.
115. Id.
116. Levin, supra note 99, at 276.
117. Id. She has developed a checklist of "features" that policymakers should
consider in designing charter school programs to ensure equality of opportunity for racial
and other historically disadvantaged students. In her "model school choice design,"
Levin requests that policymakers consider the following topics: (1) means of preventing
increased racial and economic stratification; (2) adequacy and accessibility of
information; (3) method of selection; and (4) equality of resources. Id. at 286-90.
118. See Kemerer, supra note 22, at 45; Laura F. Rothstein, School Choice and
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agreement that charter schools are obliged to adhere to all of the rules
and procedures of federal disability law." 9 Although a state may choose
to absolve charter schools from meeting certain state regulations, the
state cannot absolve them from federal regulations. Thus charter schools
must comply with such mandates, even if federal and state funding
proves insufficient to cover the cost of administering those services.
Moreover, for those charter schools that operate independently of
local school districts (as do most charter schools), they may actually
incur greater obligations than most traditional schools for servicing the
needs of students with disabilities. 20  This increased burden occurs
because independent public charter schools must assume the
responsibilities of a local education agency (LEA) and, as such, must
make appropriate services to all students who fall within the scope of
federal disabilities law. 12' Thus an independent charter school is
"obligated to provide special education services and funding to students
with disabilities in the same manner that the [school district] provides
support to its other public school programs."'' 2  Unless they are able to
make agreements with other charter schools or LEAs, the charter schools
must provide these services themselves. 123  Their obligation to do so
stems from the fact that each of the fifty states accepts federal funding to
assist in covering the cost of educating students with disabilities.
24
Their receipt of federal funding is conditioned on an agreement by the
states, through their state education agency (SEA), mandating that all of
their LEAs comply with the three primary federal disabilities statutes: the
IDEA, Section 504, and Title 11.125
Students with Disabilities, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY: POLITICS,
POLICY, AND LAW 332 (Steven D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999); Heubert,
supra note 25,
119. There are three federal disability laws that apply to public schools (including
public charter schools) and schools operated by private entities that accept federal
funding. The first is the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), 20
U.S.C. §§ 1401-1491 (2003). The second is Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act,
which prevents discrimination on the basis of disability in any federally assisted program.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (2003). The third is Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
which provides coverage similar to that of Section 504. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189
(2003). The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also inhibits these
schools from engaging in intentional differential treatment of students with disabilities.
Because the IDEA, Section 504 and Title II provide more extensive and particularized
protections, however, advocates generally rely on these statutes rather than on the
constitutional provision to secure protections.
120. See Heubert, supra note 25, at 313-14.
121. Id.
122. Rothstein, supra note 118, at 336.
123. See Heubert, supra note 25, at 314.
124. Id.
125. Charter schools may also encounter a second reason to adhere to federal
disability law. If they choose to receive federal charter school grants, they must agree in
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Heubert provides a comprehensive analysis of the various
obligations imposed on charter schools by each of these three federal
disabilities statutes. He points out that the IDEA contains five major
requirements: (1) that each LEA attempt to achieve nondiscrimination
"to the maximum extent appropriate" in any program in which non-
disabled children participate;126 (2) that each LEA provide students with
disabilities a "free and appropriate public education" (FAPE),1
2 1
including appropriate special education and related services; 128 (3) that
each child with disabilities receive assessments by means of an
"individualized educational program" (IEP); 1 29 (4) that students with
disabilities obtain placement in the "least restrictive environment" (LRE)
to "the maximum extent appropriate;"'130  and (5) that teachers who
instruct students with disabilities possess the highest standards of special
education certification within their respective states.131
Although Heubert further notes that Section 504 and Title II in
advance to comply with the IDEA, Section 504, and Title II. Grants are available under
the following acts: Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-8962
(2003); Goals 2000: Educate America Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 5801-6084 (2003); and School-
to-Work Opportunities Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6251 (2003).
126. See Education Program Options, 34 C.F.R. § 300.305 (2003) requiring each LEA
to "take steps to ensure that its children with disabilities have available to them the
variety of educational programs and services available to nondisabled children."
127. An "appropriate" education is one that has been developed using the procedures
that the IDEA prescribes and is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
educational benefits." See Carter ex rel. Carter v. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four, 950
F.2d 156, 160 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982)), aff'd, 114 S.
Ct. 361 (1993). The IDEA requires that each child receive a program under which
educational progress is likely, but does not require schools to provide the services that
would enable a disabled child to maximize his or her personal potential. See Bd of Educ.
v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189 (1982); Heubert, supra note 25, at 316.
128. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(22) (2004). "Special education" is defined to mean
"specially designed instruction, at no cost to the parents, to meet the unique needs of a
child with a disability." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25) (2004). "Related services" include
"transportation and such developmental, corrective and other supportive services ... as
may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education." 20
U.S.C. § 1401(22) (2004). "Specific related services include: speech pathology and
audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation,
including therapeutic recreation, early identification and assessment of disabilities in
children, counseling services, including rehabilitative counseling, and medical services
for diagnostic or evaluation purposes. The term also includes school health services,
social work services in schools, and parent counseling and training." Heubert, supra note
25, at 316 n. 68.
129. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.531 (2003).
130. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b)(1) (2003).
131. Heubert also identifies other IDEA requirements with which LEAs must comply,
such as the requirement that they follow specific procedures governing long-term
suspensions; that they provide parental notification of and consent to evaluations and
placement settings; and that they reimburse parents for legal fees should a legal dispute
be resolved in the parent's favor. See Heubert, supra note 25, at 318.
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many respects also mirror and incorporate IDEA requirements, he
demonstrates that the two provisions also provide enhanced protections
for students with disabilities.3 2  The first area of enhanced protections
involves the scope of coverage. Section 504 and Title II "are more
extensive ... in the types of disabilities they cover, the class of
individuals they protect, and the safeguards they provide against coercion
and retaliation."' 33 The second area involves the duty to provide and pay
for FAPE. Heubert suggests that LEAs may find the FAPE requirement
within Section 504 and Title II harder to meet because the two provisions
contain an "equality" definition of FAPE. 134 The third area derives from
the terminology of Section 504 and Title II as applied to K-12 students
and employees with disabilities. Unlike many public institutions such as
colleges, K-12 schools may not exclude certain individuals who cannot
meet essential eligibility requirements despite the institution's
willingness to make "reasonable accommodations." 1'3 The fourth area of
enhanced protection derives from the nondiscrimination provisions of
Section 504 and Title II that extend beyond the requirements of the
IDEA. The focus of these provisions is on denoting what policies and
actions may constitute unlawful discrimination.' 36 Charter schools are
especially vulnerable to potential violations because they typically offer
innovative and unique programs but often possess limited means to pool
resources and activities. 131
132. Heubert, supra note 25, at 324.
133. Id. Heubert notes, for example, that Section 504 and Title II define "disability"
broadly enough to include persons who have a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.30) (1996); 28
C.F.R. § 35.104(4) (2003). IDEA, however, limits eligibility on the basis of whether a
student's disabilities require "specially designed instruction." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25)
(2004); C.F.R. § 300.17(a)(l) (2003). See Heubert, supra note 25, at 324.
134. Id. at 327.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2003); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2003). Heubert explains that under
Section 504, an accommodation is reasonable "unless the recipient can demonstrate that
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program."
Heubert, supra note 25, at 329 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 104.12(a)(1996)). Under Title 1i, an
institution must make "reasonable modifications" to its policies, practices, and
procedures to accommodate a disabled student if it is unable to demonstrate "that the
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of its service, program, or activity."
136. Heubert outlines several actions that the provisions prohibit, including:
"excluding a student with disabilities from participation in a covered program or activity
because of his or her disability"; "denying a qualified handicapped person the opportunity
to participate in or benefit from a covered aid, benefit, or service"; "affording students
with disabilities an unequal opportunity to participate in or benefit from covered
programs and activities"; and "providing a qualified handicapped person with an aid,
benefit, or service that is not as effective as that provided to others." Id. at 331.
137. Students with disabilities enrolled in charter schools must be afforded all of the
same opportunities as other students. They cannot be left out of program participation
simply because the task of servicing them proves more onerous, and thus charter schools
will be evaluated on the same basis that other LEAs-such as traditional school
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Heubert indicates that the general standards imposed by Section 504
and Title II may be difficult for a charter school to satisfy.'38 Charter
schools must bear the burden of proof in order to receive an
exemption.139  In many instances they would not be entitled to an
exemption for their academic, language or physical fitness programs
because they could probably overcome most obstacles confronting
students with disabilities simply through the granting of waivers. 40
As demonstrated by Heubert and the other commentators previously
cited, charter schools may indeed confront a variety of potential legal
problems involving both state and federal law pertaining to
constitutional, statutory and regulatory provisions. The remainder of this
article will focus on the actual litigation experience of charter schools in
response to challenges based on that law during the first decade of their
evolution.
III. Procedural Path of Charter School Litigation
Prior to an analysis of the specific outcomes of litigation concerning
legal challenges to charter schools, it is instructive to first describe the
procedural path by which a party may pursue a claim opposing the
opening or continued operation of a charter school. 14 1 The procedure
districts-are permitted to exclude students with disabilities.
138. See Heubert, supra note 25, at 323-41.
139. Id. at 334.
140. Heubert also emphasizes that Section 504 and Title II contain additional
standards that apply to charter schools seeking to engage in selective admissions. Most
significantly, Title II states that a "public entity may not impose eligibility criteria for
participation in its programs, services, or activities that either screen out or tend to screen
out persons with disabilities, unless it can show that such requirements are necessary for
the provision of the service, program, or activity." Id. at 335. As in the case of other
standards, the "necessary" qualification incorporated herein requires a charter school that
seeks an exemption to prove undue hardship, the need to prevent a fundamental alteration
of its program, or the inability to provide a disabled student with an appropriate education
in the least restrictive environment. These concerns should not prove problematic in New
Jersey, however, because the state does not permit its charter schools to engage in
selective admissions practices. Moreover, Heubert also emphasizes that Section 504 and
Title II contain specific standards for promoting access. Those standards pertain to new
construction, alterations of existing facilities, and site selection and maintenance. He
points out that if a charter school decides to build a new facility, that facility must be
readily accessible and usable by individuals with disabilities. If a charter school decides
to alter a facility, the modified area must be accessible and usable "to the maximum
extent feasible." If a charter school decides to procure a new site, even if it does not seek
to improve it, it cannot select a site that has "the effect of excluding handicapped persons
from, denying them the benefits of, or otherwise subjecting them to discrimination." Id.
at 338. Regardless of site limitations, charter schools must "maintain in working order
equipment and features of facilities that are required to provide ready access to
individuals with disabilities." Id. at 339.
141. In some instances the party that initiates a complaint may be a charter school,
itself (not an adversary), through an official act of its board of trustees. These cases
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varies from state to state, but invariably involves a claim alleging some
violation of statutory or constitutional law first brought for disposition
before a state education official, state administrative agency, or both.
New Jersey's procedure provides an illustration. 142 Any individual or
group may begin the process in New Jersey by filing a complaint with
the State Commissioner of Education. 143  The Commissioner, in turn,
must conduct an investigation and respond to the complaint. 144 If the
party remains unsatisfied with the Commissioner's resolution of the
matter, the party may take an appeal to the State Board of Education.
45
The State Board then has thirty days to review the complaint and make a
ruling on the Commissioner's decision. 146  Once the State Board has
acted by upholding the Commissioner, overturning the Commissioner, or
declining to make a ruling, the "administrative phase" of the appeal
process is completed.
Upon completion of the administrative phase, an unsuccessful party
in most states then possesses the right to take an appeal to one of the
courts within the state's judicial branch. 147  In such states, once the
appellate court decides a matter, an unsuccessful party may further
appeal the case to the state's supreme court. The state supreme court
under most circumstances, however, does not have to review the case
and generally does not do so unless it determines that the issue(s)
presented is of major significance.
148
typically involve a matter in which a state commissioner or state agency has denied the
initial application for a charter school or subsequently suspended or revoked a charter.
142. I have used New Jersey as an example because of my special familiarity with the
state's education system and I believe it serves as a good model for illustration.
143. Actually, in New Jersey a party is instructed to begin the process of challenging
the status of a charter school by filing a complaint with the board of trustees of the
charter school alleging a violation of the state's regulatory scheme. If, after presenting
the complaint, the party determines that the board of trustees has not adequately
addressed the complaint, that party may then proceed with a complaint filed with the
State Commissioner of Education. In addition to this formal legal procedure, the
enabling statute also requires the board of trustees of each charter school to establish an
advisory grievance committee consisting of both parents and teachers. This committee,
which is selected by all of the teachers and parents, is authorized to make non-binding
recommendations concerning the disposition of any complaints brought against the
charter school. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-15 (2003).
144. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-15 (2003).
145. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-4(d) (2003).
146. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-4(d) (2003).
147. For example, in New Jersey, a dissatisfied party may appeal the case to the
Superior Court, Appellate Division. See N.J. CT. R. 2:2-3 (2003).
148. It should be noted that, once the state supreme court has either denied an appeal
or rendered a decision, an unsuccessful party may seek to have the United States
Supreme Court hear the case by filing a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court will not
hear such a case, however, unless it involves a substantial question regarding the United
States Constitution or other federal law. To date, the Supreme Court has not heard any
case involving a charter school as one of the litigants.
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Alternatively, certain parties may choose to bypass the state system
of judicial review and elect to bring an action in the United States
District Court of the state in which the challenged charter school is
located. To bring a federal claim, a party must allege that a defendant
has violated some federal law or regulation. 49 Once the United States
District Court has made a decision, an unsuccessful litigant may choose
to have the case reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
judicial circuit representing that state. 150  It is then possible for an
unsuccessful litigant to seek to have the United States Supreme Court
review the Circuit Court's decision, by seeking to obtain a writ of
certiorari.' 5' Review by the Supreme Court is discretionary and not
likely; as of the date of this writing, the United States Supreme Court has
not yet ruled on litigation related to the operation of a public charter
school. 
52
IV. Issues Involved in Challenges to Charter Schools in State Courts
An electronic inquiry by means of WESTLAW and LEXIS, in
addition to an extensive literature search, has revealed a total of twenty-
five cases that state courts have decided prior to 2002 involving charter
schools as litigants. This list does not include the lower court decisions
of the same cases that were subsequently appealed to and heard by higher
courts within the same jurisdiction. Nor does the list include cases in
which charter schools were implicated but not actual litigants,153 nor
149. These include Constitutional challenges as well as civil rights obligations under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, color, or national origin; Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in education programs; Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability; and
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, which prohibits discrimination on
the basis of disability.
150. There are eleven numbered circuits representing the fifty states, Puerto Rico, and
the Virgin Islands. Additionally there is the D.C. Circuit representing the District of
Columbia. 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (2003).
151. It takes the affirmative vote of four Justices to accept the writ and review the
case. See generally, Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70, 99
(1955).
152. It is also possible that an unsuccessful litigant who has pursued claims in a state
judicial system could seek to have the United States Supreme Court rule on their case,
provided that they had exhausted their avenues of appeal at the state level and provided
that at least one of more of their claims involved federal issues. To date, the United
States Supreme Court has not heard such a case.
153. For example, I omitted from the list Jersey City Educ. Ass'n v. Jersey City, 720
A.2d 356 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1998), because the impacted charter school was not a litigant.
The local teachers' association had brought the case against the city, challenging its
authority to use municipal bonds to construct a multipurpose facility that would house the
charter school. The association alleged that this proposed use would violate a provision
in New Jersey's Charter School Program Act. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-10
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cases concerning personal contract issues or other common disputes that
charter schools engaged in with employees or vendors. 154 The list of
cases cited herein derives from twelve states, and the cases are listed
below by state with a brief designation for convenience in making
reference to them:
Arizona:
AZ-I Salt River Prima-Maricopa Indian Community School
v. Arizona, 23 P.3d 103 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
AZ-2 Shelby School v. Arizona State Board of Education,
962 P.2d 230 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
California:
CA-I Wilson v. State Board of Education, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d.
745 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
Colorado:
CO-I Academy of Charter Schools v. Adams County School
District No. 12, 32 P.3d 456 (Colo. 2001).
CO-2 Board of Education in the Denver School Dist. No. I
v. Booth, 984 P.2d 639 (Colo. 1999).
Florida:
FL-i Orange Ave. Charter School v. St. Lucie County
School Board, 763 So. 2d. 531, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (cert.
denied).
Illinois:
IL-i Board of Education of Consolidated School District,
No. 59 v. Illinois State Board of Education, 740 N.E.2d 428 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2000).
Massachusetts:
MA-I Russo v. Reilly, 2001 WL 716883 (Mass. App. Ct.
2001).
Michigan:
MI-I Council of Organizations and Others for Education
About Parochiad v. Governor, 566 N.W. 2d 208 (Mich. 1997).
New Jersey:
NJ-i In re Englewood, 727 A.2d 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1999) aff'd as modified by 753 A.2d 687 (N.J. 2000).155
(2003), which prohibits a charter school from constructing a facility with public funds.
The Appellate Division affirmed, reasoning that the charter school did not plan to own
the proposed facility and would occupy only a portion of the building, renting it at fair
market value.
154. For example, I have omitted from the list Mystic Valley Regional Charter Sch. v.
Advantaged Schs., Inc., 2000 WL 33171074 (Mass. Super. 2000), a case involving the
issue of whether a charter school owed a vendor money for professional services.
155. This case consolidated three separate local school district appeals against three
individual charter schools: Englewood on the Palisades Charter School, Bergen County;
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NJ-2 In re International Charter School of Trenton, No. A-
4932-97T1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
NJ-3 In re Patrick Douglas Charter School, No. A-4713-
97T1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
NJ-4 In re Red Bank Charter School, No. A-4725-97TI
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
NJ-5 In re Greater Brunswick Charter School, No. A-4557-
97T1F (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).156
New York:
NY-1 Board of Education of the Roosevelt Union Free
School District v. Board of Trustees of the State of New
University of New York, 723 N.Y.S.2d 262 (N.Y. 2001)
NY-2 International High v. Mills, 715 N.Y.S.2d 490 (2000).
Pennsylvania:
PA-i West Chester Area School District v. Collegium
Charter School, 812 A.2d 1172 (Pa. 2002).
PA-2 Brackbill v. Ron Brown Charter School, 777 A.2d 131
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).
PA-3 The School District of Philadelphia v. Independence
Charter School, 774 A.2d 798 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).
PA-4 The Board of School Directors of School District of
City of York v. Lincoln-Edison Charter School, Inc., 785 A.2d 180
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).
PA-5 Souderton Area School District v. Souderton Charter
School Collaborative, 764 A.2d 688 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
PA-6 Shenango Valley Regional Charter School v.
Hermitage School District, 756 A. 2d 1191 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000).
South Carolina:
SC-1 Beaufort County Board of Education v. Lighthouse
Charter School Committee, 516 S.E.2d 655 (S.C. 1999).
Utah:
UT-I Utah School Board Association v. Utah State Board of
Education, 17 P.3d 1125 (Utah 2001).
Many of the cited cases contain multiple issues. In discussing them,
I have followed an issue-oriented classification system similar to those
utilized in several previous law review articles.1 57 This methodology
Classical Academy Charter School of Clifton, Passaic County; and Franklin Charter
School, Somerset County.
156. This case was subsequently modified by the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re
Charter Sch. Application of the Greater Brunswick Charter Sch., 753 A.2d 686 (N.J.
2000).
157. See, e.g., Wall, supra note 21.
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helps to facilitate easy reference and comparison. Because some of the
cases contain multiple issues, however, such cases appear under more
than one subsection.
A. Issues Regarding State Constitutional Questions
Several state courts have ruled on state constitutional challenges to
their charter school enabling act regarding issues of accountability,
control, and method of funding. As noted in the discussion of previous
legal commentary, 158 the Michigan Supreme Court decided the earliest
and most publicized of these cases, Council of Organizations and Others
for Education about Parochiad (MI-1). 159 In that case the plaintiffs
presented a broad-based challenge to Michigan's charter school enabling
act, contending that the act was unconstitutional because its charter
schools were not sufficiently within the ambit of state control. 60 The
plaintiffs further contended that the governing boards of the charter
schools were not public entities as required by the constitution, given the
fact that they had not been publicly elected. 61 In holding against this
challenge, the Michigan Supreme Court determined that the charter
school enabling act, as amended, provided sufficient public
accountability by means of its extensive implementation process of
charter approval and monitoring.162 Additionally, the court rejected an
allegation that the enabling act violated the 1970 "parochiad
amendment" to the state constitution,1 63 prohibiting public funds from
being spent on religious schools. 164 The court held that charter schools
could not be construed as parochial schools, noting that the enabling act
specifically exempted religious organizations from establishing a charter
school and prohibited charter schools from any organizational or
contractual affiliation with churches or other religious institutions. 165
The Colorado case of Board of Education in the Denver School
Dist. (CO-2) presented related issues. In that case the Colorado Supreme
Court dealt with a constitutional question concerning the allocation of
authority between the state board of education and a local board of
education. 66 The court upheld the state board's authority to review the
local board's decisions on charter applications, ruling that the state
158. See supra notes 26 and 34 and accompanying text.
159. 556 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1997).
160. Id. at 215.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 216.
163. See MICH. CONST. art. IIX, §2.
164. Parochiad, 556 N.W.2d 221.
165. Id.
166. Bd. of Educ. in the Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Booth, 984 P.2d 639 (Colo. 1999).
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legislature's policy of permitting a "second appeal" by a charter school
to the state board was constitutional.167 The court therefore concluded
that the state board possessed the right to make an independent
determination as to whether to approve a charter school application.
168
The Utah Supreme Court in Utah School Board Association (UT-1)
also examined the control and supervisory powers granted by the
enabling act to the state board of education.1 69 Utilizing the same general
rationale as the highest courts in Michigan and Colorado, the Utah
Supreme Court ruled that the distribution of such powers to its state
board did not violate the state constitution. 70
Moreover, in Wilson (CA-1) the California Court of Appeals
considered the claim of two residents challenging the right of that state's
board of education to expend any funds on charter schools based on the
premise that the state constitution prohibited public money from going to
a school not under the exclusive control of the public schools.1 7 1 Once
again the court applied reasoning similar to that of sister states and held
that charter schools were exclusively within the public school system and
that taxpayer funding on their behalf resulted in no constitutional
impediment. 172
Of all the state courts, New Jersey's appellate courts have decided
the greatest number of state constitutional challenges to charter schools.
In the cases of Patrick Douglas Charter School (NJ-3) and Red Bank
Charter School (NJ-4), the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate
Division, considered whether the state's Charter School Program Act
was unconstitutional because it may have created a conflict of interest for
the Commissioner of Education. 73 The local school districts claimed
that the Commissioner was compelled to approve charter schools to
satisfy a quota that the New Jersey Legislature had mandated in the
167. Id. at 655.
168. Id. at 654.
169. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-la-505 (2003). Subsection (1)(a) of this statute
makes clear that an applicant for a charter school may seek sponsorship of its charter
from the State Board of Education only after the applicant has sought and been denied
sponsorship by a local school board.
170. The court found that "[f]rom the common and ordinary understanding of the
plain language of the Utah Constitution, it is clear that the State Board has been vested
with the authority to direct and manage all aspects of the public education system in
accordance with the laws made by the legislature. This must include not only the laws
regarding the public elementary and secondary schools, but also the laws regarding any
other schools and programs that the legislature designates as part of the public education
system." Utah Sch. Bd. Ass'n v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 17 P.3d 1125, 1131 (Utah
2001).
171. Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
172. Id. at 754.
173. In re Patrick Douglas Charter Sch., No. A-4713-97TI (N.J. App. Div. 1999); In
re Red Bank Charter Sch., No. A-4725-97T1 (N.J. App. Div. 1999).
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enabling act. 174 In rejecting this claim, the court held that a conflict of
interest or act of bias could only arise from personal interest, which the
plaintiffs had not demonstrated in this case. 75  The court noted that,
within the context of charter school applications, the Commissioner
could only approve a proposed school if it met the standards that the
Legislature had specified in the enabling act. 176  Furthermore, the
Commissioner had a firm responsibility to adhere to the underlying
policies of the enabling act. Consequently, the court found that the
Commissioner did not have "unbridled discretion" and did not possess an
inherent conflict of interest. 1
77
Another New Jersey case, Englewood on the Palisades Charter
School (NJ-I), decided by the Superior Court, Appellate Division and
subsequently affirmed by the the state's Supreme Court, presented the
broadest array of state constitutional challenges to charter schools,
including several constitutional challenges predicated on the state's
Thorough and Efficient ("T & E") Clause. 78 In that case the Appellate
Division held that the charter school's lack of specific programs for
gifted and talented students did not violate the T & E Clause, opining
that parents could take appropriate action if the school did not meet the
needs of such students. 179 It also held that a charter school's decision to
hire independent contractors for guidance and counseling services did
not violate the clause.1
8 0
In addition, the Appellate Division determined that a charter
school's use of outside contractors to conduct teacher evaluations did not
fall outside of the parameters of the T & E Clause. 18' The court,
however, did acknowledge that a school district has standing to allege
that the application of the enabling statute could prevent it from fulfilling
its responsibility under the T & E Clause. 82 Nevertheless, it found that
the funding scheme contained within the charter school enabling statute,
as applied to this particular school district,'8 3 was not unconstitutional,
174. Technically, the Legislature did not mandate a quota. It specified that a
maximum of 135 charter schools should be established during the first four years of the
program, with at least three located in each of the state's twenty-one counties. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-3(b) (2003).
175. See Patrick Douglas, No. A-4713-97T1, at * 10; Red Bank, No. A-4725-97T1, at
*3.
176. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-4 (2003).
177. See Patrick Douglas, No. A-4713-97T1, at *9.
178. See N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
179. See In re Englewood, 727 A.2d 15, 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
180. Id. at 34.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 40.
183. The particular school district in this instance was Franklin Township. As
previously noted, the case of Englewood on the Palisades Charter School constituted a
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since the district had not alleged any "pernicious impact" that had
resulted from its obligation to fund the charter school. 1
84
In failing to find other potential constitutional infirmities in
Englewood, the Appellate Division held that the Charter School Program
Act did not violate the provision in the state constitution that prohibits
state and local governments from dispensing money to a private "society,
association, or corporation."'1 85  Instead, it found that charter schools
serve a public purpose and that publicly elected bodies (i.e., the local
school boards) dispense the funding to these public institutions. 186 The
court also held that the enabling act did not violate the provision in the
state constitution that mandates that legislative power be vested in the
state Senate and General Assembly.18 7 Similar to the Michigan Supreme
Court's previous determination,' 88 it determined that charter schools do
not operate independently of legislative authority and that they remain
under the control of the Commissioner and State Board of Education,
which, in turn, are subject to a selection process that the Legislature has
established. 89
Moreover, in Englewood the Appellate Division also ruled on issues
involving state constitutional provisions concerning equal protection and
racial discrimination. It determined that the Charter School Program Act
did not violate Article I, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution,
which embodies the guarantee of equal protection.'9 The court found
that the statute satisfied the applicable balancing test, requiring an
assessment of whether an "appropriate" governmental interest "suitably
furthered" differential treatment, taking into account "the nature of the
consolidation of three separate cases. As one of the plaintiffs in the case, the Franklin
Township School District had appealed the Commissioner's approval of the charter
application of the Franklin Charter School, Somerset County. See Englewood, 727 A.2d
at 20.
184. The plaintiff in Patrick Douglas Charter School also asserted that the enabling
act's funding mechanism would preclude it from meeting its T & E obligation. In that
case the Appellate Division held that the issue was not ripe for resolution, because the
charter school had only been in operation for less than one year. Thus it would have been
"premature" for the court to assess the charter school's impact on the quality of education
that the local school district was able to provide. See Patrick Douglas, No. A-4713-
97T1, at *33.
185. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, 3.
186. See Englewood, 727 A.2d at 43.
187. See N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 1, 1.
188. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
189. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:4-4 (2003).
190. Presumably, one of the reasons that the plaintiffs decided to bring an equal
protection claim under New Jersey's state constitution (in addition to a claim under the
United States Constitution as noted in the next subsection) is that the New Jersey
Supreme Court has held that the state's equal protection clause in some instances
provides greater protection than its federal counterpart.
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affected right, the extent to which the governmental restriction intrudes
upon it, and the public need for the restriction."' 9' The court further
found that, although the enabling act creates two categories of public
education-charter schools and traditional schools-and treats them
differently, the act does so in order to advance the state interest in
comprehensive educational reform and the act's implementation has not
been shown to intrude on the right to equal educational access.1
92
Finally, the Appellate Division found that, as applied, the charter
school enabling act did not violate Article I, paragraph 5 of the state
constitution, which guarantees that students will not be segregated on
account of their race. 93  The court determined that, ir this case, the
plaintiff had failed to identify any particular infringement to African-
American students, and thus the court found no unconstitutional
discrimination. 194
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the Appellate
Division's decision in Englewood, the state's highest court deemed it
necessary to issue specific guidelines concerning the problem of
potential racial segregation. 95  The New Jersey Supreme Court thus
ordered the State Commissioner of Education, prior to approving new
charter schools, to assess the racial impact that the proposed schools
would have on the districts that they would serve. 196 It also ordered the
Commissioner to make a similar review of existing charter schools on an
annual basis. 197 Moreover, it directed the Commissioner to ensure that
191. Englewood, 727 A.2d at 48 (citing Greenburg v. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d 294, 302
(N.J. 1985)).
192. The plaintiff school district in Patrick Douglas made a similar equal protection
argument before the Appellate Division, asserting that the charter school enabling act
created two "uneven playing fields." Patrick Douglas, No. A-4713-97T1 at *13. The
district contended that it had to play by all the rules and regulations, while charter
schools, by virtue of the enabling act, did not have to play by those requirements. In
again relying on and applying the same balancing test as in Englewood, the court noted
that the state's main reason for establishing charter schools was to create a non-traditional
(and thus separate) learning environment. Regardless, the court found that the
relationship between the charter schools and traditional schools was intertwined, and that
charter schools therefore constituted an important component of public education.
Englewood, 727 A.2d at 48.
193. Englewood, 727 A.2d at 49.
194. Id.
195. The New Jersey Supreme Court held, "[a]ccordingly, we hold that the
Commissioner must assess the racial impact that a charter school applicant will have on
the district of residence in which the charter school will operate. We express no view on
the formality or structure of that analysis except to state that it must take place before
final approval is granted to a charter school applicant." Englewood, 753 A.2d at 694.
196. Id.
197. These Supreme Court guidelines appear to qualify a prior ruling of the Appellate
Division in the case involving the Patrick Douglas Charter School. In Patrick Douglas,
the local school district had alleged that the enabling act was unconstitutional because it
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charter schools did not create a segregative effect in other districts that
send students to charter schools. 198 As its primary rationale for ordering
such protective guidelines, the New Jersey Supreme Court cited the
state's longstanding "abhorrence of discrimination and segregation in the
public schools." 199
Furthermore, in upholding Englewood the New Jersey Supreme
Court also expressed concern that a charter school might impinge on a
local school district's financial ability to fulfill its T & E
responsibilities. °° It therefore ordered the Commissioner to assess the
economic impact of a charter school on its district of residence after the
district has made a preliminary demonstration that its ability to meet its T
& E obligation has been compromised.20'
A similar claim alleging a potentially devastating fiscal impact was
also raised in one of the New York cases, Roosevelt Union Free School
District (NY-1). The board of education of a financially troubled Long
Island school district asserted that the opening of an approved charter
school would produce severe economic hardship on the school district.
20 2
The school board further asserted that the economic hardship would, in
turn, impede the school district's ability to provide a constitutionally
adequate education for other district students.20 3 Consequently, the
school district insisted that, as applied to its circumstances, the 1998
charter school enabling act was unconstitutional.20 4 The appellate court,
does not mandate that the Commissioner consider the racial impact that a charter school
might have on the district. In that case the Appellate Division had not found the enabling
act, as applied, unconstitutional because of unusual circumstances. The court noted that a
desegregation order was in effect in the school district, an order that "removes any threat
that the charter school will interfere with the right of any public school student to a
quality education." Patrick Douglas, No. A-4713-97T1 at *14. The court therefore
found no reason to void the enabling act or grounds to direct the Commissioner to assess
the charter school's racial impact on the local district.
198. The New Jersey Supreme Court left the details of carrying out these orders to the
Commissioner and State Board of Education.
199. Englewood, 753 A.2d at 692.
200. As noted above, this issue was raised in Roosevelt Union Free School District,
723 N.Y.S.2d 262 (N.Y. 2001) (NY-1).
201. Englewood, 753 A.2d at 698. After rendering its decision in Englewood, the
New Jersey Supreme Court also ruled on the local school district's appeal of the
Appellate Division's decision in Greater Brunswick Charter School (NJ-5). See 164 N.J.
314, 753 A.2d 686 (2000). Although it affirmed that decision, the New Jersey Supreme
Court modified it, holding that it must conform to its ruling in Englewood.
Consequently, the Commissioner would be obligated to adhere to the supreme court's
guidelines, which would require annual assessments of the racial and fiscal impacts of
this charter school to ensure that the constitutional mandates pertaining to racial
segregation and T & E education were not being violated.
202. See Roosevelt, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 264.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 168.
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however, failed to rule on the issue of constitutionality, holding that the
school district-as a subdivision of state government-lacked the legal
capacity to mount such a challenge against the state.2°5
Although unresolved in this New York case, the issue as to the
extent of the fiscal impact of the ever-increasing number of charter
schools on local school districts may continue to be a legitimate concern
for those policymakers involved with the adequacy of public education.
It would appear of most concern to policymakers in those districts,
typically consisting of a high concentration of low-income and other
historically disadvantaged students, in which financial resources are
already the most limited. But paradoxically, the proponents of charter
schools insist that it is in these same districts that charter schools are
most needed, since they will provide choice of schools to many students
who would otherwise not be afforded such an opportunity.2 °6 So far,
state courts have seemed reluctant to take sides in this debate and have
resisted making a determination on whether the fiscal impact has reached
the level of a constitutional infirmity. Instead, they have preferred to
leave resolution of this politically charged question either to state
educational commissioners or to their state legislatures.
B. Issues Regarding Interpretation of the States' Charter School
Enabling Act
Many of the state court cases have involved an interpretation of the
states' charter school enabling acts as they have pertained to the
application for approval or operation of individual charter schools. All
six Pennsylvania court cases involved issues related to this topic. In each
of these cases the local school district, usually in combination with local
taxpayers, challenged a decision of the state's Charter School Appeal
Board ("CAB") that granted approval of a proposed charter school after
the district had previously denied the application. In each case the
plaintiffs proved unsuccessful.
Several of the Pennsylvania cases turned on procedural
technicalities. In one case, Brackbill (PA-2), the Commonwealth Court
approved a CAB decision because the plaintiff, the Harrisburg School
District, had failed to act quickly enough in issuing a written denial of a
revised charter school application that the district had deemed
insufficient. 20 7 The district had not issued its decision within forty-five
205. Id. at 172 (citing City of New York v. State of New York, 655 N.E.2d 649;
Gulotta v. State of New York, 645 N.Y.S.2d 41, appeal dismissed, 674 N.E.2d 332, leave
denied, 679 N.E.2d 642).
206. See supra, note 2 and accompanying text.
207. See Brackbill v. Ron Brown Charter Sch., 777 A.2d 131 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).
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days of the formal hearing on the matter as required by the charter school
208act. In its ruling, the court determined that time was of the essence,
thus holding that the district had forfeited its right to deny the charter
application.2 °9 In a similar case, The School District of Philadelphia
(PA-3), the Commonwealth Court held that the plaintiff school district
had also relinquished its right to deny a charter school application,
having failed to act within the seventy-five day period required for initial
charter applications.210
In another Pennsylvania case, Souderton Area School District (PA-
5), the plaintiff school district, challenged the right of the CAB to
conduct a de novo review of the district's preliminary decision and to use
that review as a basis for overturning the district's denial of a charter
school application.21' If authorized, a de novo review would entitle the
CAB to make an independent determination of the facts concerning the
application and, therefore, to draw different conclusions than those of the
district. The commonwealth court dispensed with the issue simply by
holding that the CAB was well within its authority to initiate such a
procedure.
Plaintiffs in several Pennsylvania cases also alleged that proposed
charter schools had not satisfied the provision in the enabling statute
requiring them to demonstrate "sustainable community support.,
212
Apparently, however, the commonwealth court did not consider this to
be a stringent standard, interpreting the statute in Brackbill (PA-2) to
mean that the applicant must merely show "reasonably sufficient support
from the community." 213 In another case, The Board of Directors of
School District of City of York (PA-4), the commonwealth court held that
a charter school had sufficiently demonstrated the requisite community
support simply by presenting petitions containing a sizable number of
signatures--even though the signatures did not include corresponding
addresses. 14
In the one decision rendered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
West Chester Area School District (PA-1), the plaintiff alleged that the
enabling act prohibited a proposed charter school from recruiting
students outside the local school district because the school had failed to
208. See 24 PA CONS. STAT. § 17-1717-A(f) (2003).
209. See Brackbill, 777 A.2d at 139.
210. Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Independence Charter Sch., 774 A.2d 798, 804 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2001).
211. See Souderton Area Sch. Dist. v. Souderton Charter Sch. Collaborative, 764
A.2d 688 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
212. 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 17-1717-A(e)(2)(i) (2003).
213. See Brackbill, 777 A.2d at 138.
214. See Bd. of Sch. Dist. of the Sch. Dist. of York v. Lincoln-Edison Charter Sch.
Inc., 785 A.2d 180 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).
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acquire the status of a regional charter school. Following the reasoning
of a previous decision of the Commonwealth Court,215 the Supreme
Court rejected this proposition.21 6 It determined that a charter school
could admit students from other schools districts even though it chooses
to remain a local school accountable to only one school district. 217 The
court further determined that the local school district could not impose
requirements on charter schools that it imposed on its own schools,
provided that the enabling act specifically exempted charter schools from
218such requirements.
Like the Pennsylvania cases, all five of the New Jersey appellate
court decisions upheld rulings in favor of charter schools against
challenges rendered by local school districts predicated, at least in part,
on an interpretation of the state's charters school enabling act. In each of
these cases, the State Board of Education had rendered an initial
approval. In the first of these cases, In the Matter of the Grant of the
Charter School Applications of the International Charter School and the
Granville Charter School, Mercer County (NJ-2), the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, considered four issues regarding the interpretation
and application of the New Jersey Charter School Program Act. One
issue concerned whether the State Board had erred in dismissing the
school district's appeal for being out of time.219 The court held that the
"well-settled rule that a statutory time limit on an administrative appeal
may not be relaxed by either the agency or the court.,
220
The second issue concerned whether the Commissioner had erred in
failing to provide a statement of reasons for his preliminary approval of
the charter school application. 221 The court determined that the New
Jersey Legislature, in enacting the Charter School Program Act, had not
specified that the Commissioner provide reasons for his decision, and
therefore the Commissioner was not obligated to furnish them. The third
issue concerned whether the Commissioner must accord deference to the
recommendation of the local school district in making his decision
regarding approval of a charter school application.222 Once again, the
court relied on the language of the enabling act and determined that it did
215. See West Chester Area Sch. Dist. v. Collegium Charter Sch., 760 A.2d 452 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2000).
216. See West Chester Area Sch. Dist. v. Collegium Charter Sch., 812 A.2d 1172,
1183 (Pa. 2002).
217. See 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 17-1723-A-(c) (2003).
218. See West Chester, 812 A.2d at 1183.
219. In re International Charter Sch., No. A-4932-97T1 at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1999).
220. Id. at *6.
221. Id. at *2.
222. Id.
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not require the Commissioner to give any weight to the local district's
recommendation. The final issue concerned whether the Commissioner
had miscalculated the appropriate funding to the charter schools for the
1998-99 academic year.223 The court refused to rule on the issue, finding
that the school district had not provided sufficient proof to establish a
potential miscalculation.224
Two of New Jersey's appellate division cases, Patrick Douglas
Charter School (NJ-3) and Red Bank Charter School (NJ-4), raised
similar issues. One of the issues involved the question of whether the
enabling act should be voided because it created an unfunded state
mandate that was prohibited by law.2 25 The court refused to address this
issue; instead it instructed the appellant school district to bring the claim
before the State of New Jersey Council on Local Mandates.226 A second
issue involved the question of whether the Charter School Program Act
and its regulations should be voided for failing to provide sufficient
227standards for judging the adequacy of charter school applications. The
court, however, found that the school district had not adequately
supported its claim that the act was too vague, but it did take a closer
look at the regulatory scheme to determine whether some of its
regulations were overly vague.228 Similarly, although the court found
223. Id.
224. Id. at *9.
225. See In re Patrick Douglas Charter School, No. A-4713-97T1 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1999); In re Red Bank Charter School, No. A-4725-97T1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1999). This issue appears in both Patrick Douglas and Red Bank. In each case, the
appellants claimed that the act and its regulations created unfounded state mandates
prohibited by statute. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:13H-1 (2001). Subsection (a) of that statute
reads "at the November 1995 general election, the people of this State approved an
amendment to the New Jersey Constitution providing that, in certain cases, new statutes
and new administrative rules and regulations promulgated by State agencies shall not
impose unfunded mandates on counties, municipalities or school districts."
226. The New Jersey Council on Local Mandates serves as an administrative court,
authorized by the state constitution, and provides a means of protecting local
governments from incurring the cost of state-mandated programs. See N.J. CONST. art.
VIII, § II. To bring a claim before the Council on Local Mandates, a party must allege
that a new state law or regulation has caused an increase in expenditures to a local
governmental agency, such as the local school board. If the Council determines that an
inappropriate action has occurred, it can prohibit that action from taking effect unless the
state opts to supply the requisite funding.
227. The appellant argued that while N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 112.1 (2004)
"requires that a 'description' of the [statutorily prescribed] items be given, nowhere in the
regulations is this 'description' quantified or explained." See Patrick Douglas, No. A-
4713-97T1 at *19.
228. The regulation of most concern was title 6, section 11-2.1(2)(i) of the New
Jersey Administrative Code which requires an applicant to include a description of the
areas enumerated in the enabling act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-5 (2003). N.J. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 6 § 11-2.1(2)(i)(2004). Although the court found that the regulation was quite
general in terms of soliciting detail in certain areas, such as a charter school's mission
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that the regulations sometimes "relaxed" what appeared to be mandatory
requirements of the enabling act, it held that the relaxation was necessary
in order to fulfill the primary purpose of the act.229
Among the other issues that the appellate division decided in the
Patrick Douglas and Red Bank Charter School cases was the question of
whether the Commissioner of Education had erred in deriving a funding
formula for charter school aid based on an amended regulation that the
NJDOE had proposed but not yet adopted.230 In answering that question,
the court determined that there is no provision that authorizes an appeal
of the Commissioner's preliminary budget calculation and, if the school
district wished to have the matter reviewed, it must file an appeal to the
Commissioner in the format of an ordinary school law dispute.2 3'
Another issue dealt with the question of whether the charter approvals
should have been overturned because the State Board had allegedly
abdicated its judicial function.2 32  The school districts claimed that the
Board had not made its own findings of fact, had not meaningfully
scrutinized the Commissioner's decision, and had simply presumed that
the enabling act was valid.2 33 The court, however, held that the State
Board is not a quasi-judicial body, but rather a legislative entity and,
acting in that capacity, did not abuse its review function.234
The final issue raised the question of whether the charter school
applications were defective because they included among their founders
several parents who did not have children attending district schools.235
The court reviewed the legislative history of the Charter School Act,
which permits a charter school to be founded by "a combination of
statement and curriculum, it determined that the generality of the regulation was
necessary in order for the NJDOE to fulfill the objectives of the enabling act. In doing
so, the court noted that the regulation provided a list of specific criteria and found that it
would be impractical to require more detail. The court further observed that the
Commissioner must be granted discretion and that the regulations should be presumed to
be valid. See Patrick Douglas, No. A-4713-97TI at *23.
229. As an example, the court cited N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-5(j) (2003), wherein
the act states that the initial application must indicate the address of the proposed location
of the charter school. Nevertheless, N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 11-2.1 (g) (2004) allows the
charter school to submit that location after the Commissioner has granted the school
contingent approval of its application. The court determined that such a relaxation was
reasonable, since it is often difficult for a charter school to procure a site and incur the
liability of doing so without some assurance that the Commissioner will approve its
charter application.
230. At issue were amendments not enacted until June 1, 1998. See 30 N.J. Reg.
2084(a).
231. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-9 (2003).
232. See Patrick Douglas, No. A-4713-97T1 at *29.
233. Id.
234. Id. at *31.
235. Eleven out of the nineteen named founders did not have children enrolled in the
district's schools. See Patrick Douglas, No. A-4713-97TI at *33.
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teaching staff members and parents. 236 The court held that the statute
does not expressly exclude such parents and deferred to the opinion of
the State Board, which had previously resolved the issue in favor of the
charter school applicants. 37
In a fourth case decided by the New Jersey Superior Court,
Appellate Division, Greater Brunswick Charter School (NJ-5), the
appellant school district contended that the proposed charter school
should not have been approved because of six distinct violations:
(1) independent reviewers of the proposed school had found deficiencies
in its application; (2) the Commissioner of Education lacked the
authority to request that the proposed school amend its application;
(3) the proposed school's curriculum was inadequate; (4) the proposed
school had not appointed an administrator with a principal's certification;
(5) the proposed school was a regional charter school (a type not
authorized by the enabling act); and (6) the Commissioner had not fully
gauged the adverse financial and racial impact the school would have
upon the district.238
In upholding the application of the proposed charter school, the
Appellate Division determined that, despite the fact that independent
reviewers had found shortcomings in the school's application process,
those reviewers had also given the school a strong overall rating, thus
evidencing their approval of the application. 239 The court also held that
the Commissioner's request that the charter school amend its charter was
not inconsistent with the purposes of the enabling act, even if the purpose
for doing so was to enable the school to correct mistakes and omissions
on its application. 240 Regarding the issue of the curriculum, the court
found that it would not be in the public interest to rescind the school's
charter due to a defect in the application after the school had already
opened.241 As for the issue of principal certification, the court directed
the Commissioner to order the school to "be headed by a properly-
236. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-4(a) (2003).
237. The court found that "[w]hile appellant apparently raised this point before the
State Board, that body mentioned it without discussion. By implication, the State Board
rejected this theory." See Patrick Douglas, No. A-4713-97T 1 at *34.
238. See In re Brunswick Charter Sch., No. A-4557-97TIF (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1999).
239. The court found "that both reviewers of the implementation Plan found
shortcomings in one of the three curriculum standards. But the other two curriculum
standards were rated either 'Adequate' or 'Strong.' And the reviewers' overall rating of
the Educational Program, which included the curriculum standards, was 'Strong."' See
Greater Brunswick, No. A-4557-97T1F at *5.
240. The court reasoned that "while appellant is correct that the addenda procedure
gives an applicant a chance to cure shortcomings, that kind of second chance is consistent
with the public policy behind the Act." Id. at *8.
241. Id. at*10.
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certified lead person" by the beginning of the next academic year
(September 1999), reasoning that a charter school's lead administrator
should be required to have some type of educational certification.242
Additionally, the court ruled that the enabling act does authorize
regional charter schools, noting that the act expressly permits charter
schools to enroll students beyond the confines of their local district and
243therefore it enables them to establish a regional form of organization.
The court also ruled that there was no judicial remedy to address the
local district's concern about the financial impact that the charter school
would have on the district's own school system, concluding that the New
Jersey State Legislature was the appropriate branch of government to
consider such factors.244 With respect to the final issue, the district's
concern about the racial impact that the charter school would have on the
district, the Appellate Division held that the district's racial balancing
concerns were premature and directed the Commissioner to remedy any
racial balancing problems that might arise in the future.245
In the fifth New Jersey case, Englewood on the Palisades Charter
School (NJ-1), the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed previous rulings
of the Superior Court Appellate Division on several other issues
pertaining to the application of the state's Charter School Program
246Act. The Appellate Division held that the enabling act does not
require that a charter school's founders have to consist of more than one
parent from within the local school district.24 7 It also held that the act
does not obligate the founders to have to submit the names of prospective
board members; instead it affords the founders the option of describing
the method of selection of prospective board members. 248 Although the
Appellate Division further determined that the State Board did not
possess the authority to waive the statutory requirement that a proposed
charter school identify a facility prior to approval of its application, the
court held that in this case the issue was moot, since the school in
question had already become operational. 249 The court also held that the
enabling act requires the proposed school to include the academic
calendar and school-day schedule in its charter application; however, the
act does not require the proposed school (as in this case) to demonstrate
that the calendar and schedule exhibits innovation and fiscal integrity.25 °
242. Id. at * 14.
243. The court found that the regulations "express a regional concept." Id. at * 15.
244. Id. at * 17.
245. Id. at*19.
246. In re Englewood, 727 A.2d 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
247. Id. at 27.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 28.
250. Id. at 29.
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In addressing other statutory issues, the Appellate Division held that
the provision in the enabling act requiring that a charter school's
admission policy "reflect a cross-section of the community" was
properly left to the State Board.25 1 The court also held that the provisions
in the enabling act requiring a satisfactory financial plan252 and learning
environment2 53 are best determined by the Commissioner and State
Board.254 Moreover, unless the State Board's decision regarding core
curriculum standards is "wholly unsupportable," the court ruled that it
would defer to that decision in assessing the adequacy of a charter
school's curriculum. 255  The court further ruled that the NJDOE
regulation that allows for post-application submission of information
regarding a proposed school facility is justifiable on the basis that it is
"reasonably derived" from the statutory requirement that a school
"identify" a facility in its application.256 It also held that charter school
laws need not comply with all traditional school statutes that do not
specifically apply to them.
2 57
Similar to the Pennsylvania and New Jersey cases cited above, the
Illinois case of Board of Education of Consolidated School District, No.
59 (IL-1) presented another instance in which a state court upheld a prior
decision of a state board in opposition to a local school's challenge of a
258charter school application. In this case the local district had the initial
251. Id. In this instance the State Board found that the charter school satisfied the
standard by including a general statement in its application indicating that it would seek
to attain a diverse student body. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-8 (2003).
252. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-5(l) (2003).
253. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-2 (2003).
254. Englewood, 727 A.2d at 31.
255. Id. at 33.
256. Id. at 35. Thus the court held that N.J. STAT. ANN. § 36A-5(j) (2003) provides
sufficient statutory grounds for the regulatory procedure set forth in N.J. ADMIN. CODE
§ 6A: 11-2. l(g)(3) (2003).
257. Id. at 43-44. Also in Englewood, the Appellate Division upheld several
procedural issues concerning the actions of the Commissioner and the State Board. The
court ruled that the Commissioner is not required to set forth findings of fact when the
Commissioner is not acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. In reviewing the
Commissioner's decision regarding a charter school application, an action which does not
constitute a quasi-judicial function, the court ruled that it should only overturn the
decision if it can be demonstrated that the Commissioner acted arbitrarily and
capriciously-a difficult burden of proof for a plaintiff to establish. Id. at 46-47. The
court also found that the State Board's sanction of regulations authorizing "contingent
approvals" of charter school applications was reasonable, given that the regulations were
geared toward a practical implementation of the enabling act and were not in conflict
with state law. The court acknowledged that a charter school might not be able to obtain
funding or facilities without first receiving a conditional grant of approval from the
Commissioner and thus might not be able to open unless the Commissioner possessed
such authority. Id. at 38-39.
258. Bd. of Educ. of Consol. Sch. Dist., No. 59 v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ. 740 N.E.2d
428 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
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authority to deny the approval of a proposed charter school and did so,
finding that the charter school did not meet two essential requirements of
the enabling act because it failed to: (I) demonstrate that it was
economically sound and (2) list two potential charter sites that would be
available in time for the school's scheduled opening.2 59 In overturning
that denial, the State Board of Education (through its designated Staff
Appeal Panel) determined that, although the school's proposed budget
covered only four of the five years of the proposed charter, it was in
"substantial compliance" with the statutory regulation .260 Additionally,
the State Board Panel determined that the proposed school had provided
a sufficient description of two potential sites in its charter application.
26'
In upholding the State Board's decision, the Illinois Court of Appeals
first held that the State Board had implied authority under the charter
school act to reverse a school district's denial of a charter application.2 62
It then held that the Board's decision was not clearly erroneous (i.e.,
against the manifest weight of the evidence) and, as such, must be
sustained.2 63
In the previously mentioned New York case of Board of Education
of the Roosevelt Union Free School District (NY-1), the appellate court
also ruled on several issues involving interpretation and application of
the state's charter school enabling act.264 First, the court held that a local
school district possessed the right to challenge a charter application
approved by a designated state entity, which in this instance was the
SUNY Board of Trustees. 65 The court, however, ruled that the State
Board of Regents could not be a defendant in such a suit, because under
the enabling act it remained "powerless" to prevent the SUNY Board
from approving the charter school application. 266  In a second
proceeding, 267 the appellate court subsequently held that the SUNY
Board had failed to meet the statutory requirement mandating that it
determine that the approval of the charter school application "was likely
259. Id. at 431.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 433 (citing Gersch v. Ill. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 720 N.E.2d 672, 680
(Ill. App. Ct. 1999) and O'Grady v. Cook County Sheriff's Merit Bd., 632 N.E.2d 87, 92
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994)).
263. Id. at 435.
264. Bd. of Educ. of the Roosevelt Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Bd. of Trs. of the State
Univ. of New York, 282 A.D.2d 166 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
265. Jd. at 171.
266. Id. at 173-74.
267. Bd. of Educ. of the Roosevelt Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Bd. of Trs. of the State
Univ. of New York, 713 N.Y.S.2d 908 (N.Y. 2000). The first ruling is found at 282
A.D.2d 166. Both of these proceedings constitute appeals of the New York Supreme
Court decision found at 185 Misc. 2d 704.
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to improve student learning and achievement. ' '268 The court therefore
remanded the case back to the SUNY Board of Trustees for that
obligatory determination.269
In the other New York case of International High School (NY-2), a
pre-existing school questioned restrictions placed on its educational
program following its conversion to charter school status.2 0  The
International High School had originally opened under a special
educational act, commonly referred to as the Twenty-first Century
School Act.271 The school sought to maintain a dual classification in
order to enjoy waivers granted by both the Twenty-first Century School
Act and New York's Charter Schools Act.272 In particular, the school
sought to avoid requiring its students to take the Regents Exams that
applied to charter high schools (and traditional public high schools) but
not to Twenty-first Century schools. 273 The appellate court, however,
determined that the school had voluntarily relinquished the rights granted
under its earlier status that were inconsistent with its status as a charter
school.274 The court noted that charter schools are generally "exempt
from all laws and regulations typically imposed upon public schools. 275
Given the unique privileges that charter schools obtain pertaining to
corporate structure, administration and accountability, the court found it
logical for the state to mandate that charter school students take the
Regents exams, since that testing would provide the only standardized
means by which an assessment could be made of the quality of the
schools' educational programs and the achievement of their students.276
One of the Arizona cases, Shelby School v. Arizona State Bd. of
Education (AZ-2), also involved a charter school application of a pre-
268. Id. at 913. The court, however, did hold that the SUNY Board of Trustees had
not acted improperly in determining that the charter school applicant had satisfied two
other statutory requirements: a demonstration that it had adequately considered its
financial impact on the district, and a demonstration that it had sufficient community
support.
269. Id. at 914. The appellate court did not finalize its second ruling until January
2002. It is quite conceivable that additional litigation will occur in this matter after the
SUNY Board of Trustees has conducted its obligatory determination.
270. Int'l High Sch. v. Mills, 276 A.D.2d 165 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
271. Id. at 166. See N.Y. EDUC. § 309-a (2003).
272. Id. at 166-67. See N.Y. EDUC. § 2850 (2003).
273. Id. at 170. The court took notice that "[t]he variances obtained by petitioners,
whether through their membership in the consortium or by virtue of their twenty-first
century school status, acknowledge that they would have the ability to use alternative
educational assessments only up and until the revised State Regents examinations were in
place." Id.
274. Id. at 169.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 171.
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existing school seeking to convert to charter school status.277 Before
applying to become a charter school, the Shelby School had been run by
a religious organization.2 78 In its charter school application the school
had agreed to reorganize as a non-profit, non-sectarian institution.
279
Despite its actions, the Arizona Board of Education denied the school's
application because of the "unacceptable financial history as reflected in
the credit report., 280 In ruling on the charter school's appeal, the Court
of Appeals determined that the State Board's denial of the application
did not contain an adequate statement of facts to form a permissible basis
for its decision. 281 The court also determined that the State Board erred
282in refusing to allow a revision of the application. Although it
remanded the matter to the State Board for further findings of fact, the
court did find that the Board was correct concerning the following issues:
the Board had not exceeded its authority in denying a charter based on
poor creditworthiness; the Board had not violated the Administrative
Procedures Act by failing to give proper notice; and the Board had not
violated the state's open public meetings law. 283 Additionally, the court
held that, according to the state's enabling act, no party has an absolute
claim of entitlement to a charter school and that, even after an
application is approved, the State Board still has discretion to deny a
contract.284
The one case decided by a Florida court, Orange Ave. Charter
School (FL- 1), involved an application for renewal of a charter school.28 5
It provided a rare example of a case in which a state court of appeals
upheld a local school district's decision to deny, rather than to approve, a
charter school application.286 In this instance the St. Lucie County
School Board had determined that the charter school, which had been
created to serve at-risk students, had failed to undertake assessments
agreed to in its charter. 87 The school board further determined that the
charter school's students were performing below standard, even when
277. Shelby Sch. v. Ariz. State Bd. of Educ., 962 P.2d 230 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
278. Id. at 235. The previous school had been run by the Church of Immortal
Consciousness.
279. Id. The Shelby School was described as a non-profit, tax-exempt corporation
and non-sectarian school.
280. Id. at 235.
281. Id. at 237.
282. Id. at 238.
283. Id. at 239-42.
284. Id. at 242.
285. Orange Ave. Charter Sch. v. St. Lucie County Sch. Bd., 763 So. 2d 531 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 534.
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compared only to other at-risk students.288 In affirming the school
district's decision, the Court of Appeals accorded the district maximum
discretion, finding that the "school board's action is reviewed by this
court for the presence of competent substantial evidence supporting its
decision.
' 289
C. Issues Regarding Alleged Violations of Federal Law
Although most cases in states courts involved issues concerning the
state constitution or interpretation and application of the charter school
enabling act, several cases also involved issues concerning federal law.
The most common claims in these cases were predicated on alleged
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
and/or Due Process Clause.
The most prominent case arose in South Carolina, and it attracted
national attention. In Beaufort County Board of Education v. Lighthouse
Charter School Committee (SC-1), 516 S.E.2d 655 (S.C. 1999), the
Beaufort County School Board appealed a decision issued by the State
Board of Education that reversed the county board's denial of a charter
school application.290 One of the reasons for the county board's denial
was that the projected student body of the proposed charter school would
have deviated more than ten percent from the racial composition of the
school district, in violation of a provision in the charter school enabling
act. 291 The county board feared that the school "would become a white
enclave in a district split almost evenly between blacks and whites. 292
In reversing the State Board's decision, the South Carolina Supreme
Court gave credence to the county board's rationale. The court ruled that
the enabling act provided grounds to deny a charter if an applicant failed
to satisfy the act's racial composition and other requirements, and further
held that the county board's determination was not erroneous.293
During the appeal process, however, the state attorney general had
been permitted to intervene and had raised the issue of whether the
controversial racial provision was constitutional.294 The attorney general
asserted that such a provision could not withstand an equal protection
288. Id. at 533.
289. Id. at 534.
290. See Beaufort County Bd. of Educ. v. Lighthouse Charter Sch. Comm., 516
S.E.2d 655 (S.C. 1999).
291. Id. at657.
292. See D. Bowman, Judge Overturns South Carolina's Charter School Law,
Education Week on the Web (July 29. 2002), available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/
ewstory.cfm?slug=37sc.hl 19.
293. Lighthouse, 516 S.E.2d at 659. The court also held that the school district could
deny approval because of demonstrated health and safety problems.
294. Id. at 660.
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challenge, and therefore was impermissible-even if its intention was
295benign or remedial. He contended that the provision resulted in a
classification system based on race, which was unconstitutional because
the state could not establish a compelling interest to justify its use. The
South Carolina Supreme Court declined to rule on this constitutional
issue, however, since it found separate reasons to sustain the county
board's denial of the charter application.296 Nevertheless, it determined
that the case should be remanded to a state trial court for further findings
on the equal protection challenge because the question of
constitutionality would arise again if the proposed charter school were to
reapply for a charter.297
The following year, in an unreported decision regarding the remand,
a South Carolina circuit court judge did find the provision
unconstitutional, holding that it "would require the school to use racial
discrimination in its admission process., 298 Furthermore, the judge held
that the racial-diversity requirement could not be separated from the rest
of the charter school enabling act and, therefore, declared the entire act
void. This decision placed the entire charter school program in South
Carolina in jeopardy and shifted the focus to the State Legislature for
potential resolution. In an attempt to salvage the program, the State
Legislature enacted an amendment to its charter school act, effective July
1, 2002.299 The amendment increases the allowable racial deviation from
10% to 20% of the local district's student population and no longer
makes compliance mandatory. 300 If the permitted deviation is exceeded,
the state board must make a determination as to whether the deviation is
justified.3 '
The outcome of the Lighthouse case may serve as a harbinger of a
295. Id. at 660-61. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (classification based
solely on race is subject to strict scrutiny, even when it is a "benign" or "remedial" racial
classification).
296. Id. at 661. The court pointed out that the local school district in which the
proposed Lighthouse Charter School was situated (on Hilton Head Island) had entered
into a voluntary desegregation agreement in 1970 with the United States Department of
Education Office of Civil Rights. That agreement required the Office of Civil Rights to
approve any new school facility within the district, and the Office had subsequently
indicated that a charter school would also have to submit its plans for agency approval.
The proposed Lighthouse Charter School had not complied, which was part of the
reasoning why the county board had denied its application. Id. at 659.
297. Id. at 661.
298. Supra note 291, at 1. Judge Jackson V. Gregory rendered the decision on May 8,
2000.
299. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-40-70(D) (2002).
300. Id.
301. Id. As of the date of the writing of this article, the revised charter school
admissions regulation has not been challenged.
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potentially serious problem for charter school programs throughout the
country. Like South Carolina, many states have requirements aimed at
thwarting segregation and disproportionate racial and ethnic
representation in the charter school admissions process.302  It remains
uncertain whether such requirements can survive future equal protection
challenges. The answer may depend largely on the extent to which state
and federal courts construe the requirements as mandatory quotas or as
desirable goals. It seems likely that states will insist that their
admissions' criteria are not so restrictive as to engender reverse
discrimination. A decision may turn on the requirements as they apply in
individual circumstances in specific charters schools, not simply on the
language of the regulations or professed position of state or charter
school officials.
30 3
Three of the New Jersey cases also raised issues pertaining to the
Fourteenth Amendment. In the Appellate Division cases of Patrick
Douglas Charter School and In re Red Bank Charter School (NJ-3 and
NJ-4), the local school districts claimed that the New Jersey Charter
School Program Act was unconstitutional because it failed to provide
local school districts with a hearing on an application, thereby violating
the district's right to procedural due process. 30 4 Because it determined
that the Commissioner of Education was not acting in a judicial capacity
when dealing with charter schools, the court held that the Commissioner
need not provide a pre-decision hearing. 30 5 The Commissioner also did
not have to make findings of fact or provide reasons for approval of a
302. See, e.g., New Jersey's statutory criteria, set forth in N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 18A:36A-8 (2003), which requires a charter school to enroll a cross-section of the
community's school age population, including proportionate racial diversity "to the
maximum extent practicable."
303. Such a decision must be in compliance with the recently decided Supreme Court
decision of Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). In this consolidated case, white
candidates for admission to the University of Michigan and its law school brought
reverse affirmative action challenges, alleging that their qualifications were superior to
those of certain groups of protected minorities. The undergraduate school awarded
additional "points" (twenty out of a total of 150) to historically disadvantaged minority
candidates in its admissions formula. The law school's admissions process, which is
similar to many others in highly competitive institutions, did not rely on fixed quotas for
specific groups; rather, it sought to obtain a "critical mass" (of between 12% and 20%) of
minority students to foster an enriched learning environment. The law school maintained
that a minimal amount is necessary to ensure that individual members did not feel
isolated or intimidated.
304. This same type of claim was also raised in the Appellate Division case of In re
Englewood, 727 A.2d 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). The court treated it in the
same manner as it did in this case.
305. In re Red Bank Charter Sch., 843 A.2d at 372-73. The court likened the
Commissioner's function to that of an administrator's function in determining whether to
issue a permit, and it thus found that a hearing was not required for such a determination.
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charter school application.30 6 The court emphasized that the local school
district possessed the right to submit its objections to the granting of a
charter application to the Commissioner, as well as the right to appeal the
Commissioner's decision to the State Board and the Appellate
Division.30 7  The court therefore concluded that local school districts
were not entitled to further due process. It also determined that, in an
appeal of the Commissioner's decision in such cases, the court should
adhere to the "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable" standard of review,
rather than the "substantial credible evidence" standard. 30 8 The court
maintained that, though the approval in this case might be "second
guessed for its wisdom or correctness," the decision was not arbitrary or
capricious, given the extensive application and evaluative procedure.30 9
Therefore the New Jersey Charter School Program Act, as applied in this
case, was not void on procedural due process grounds.
In the Appellate Division decision in In re Grant of Charter School
Application of Englewood on the Palisades Charter School, the local
school district claimed that the Charter School Program Act violated the
one-person, one-vote principle guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 310 The court, however, found no
violation, noting that voters in a local school district do not have a
constitutional right to vote for school board members or school
budgets.31 1  Based on the enabling act's method of charter school
governance, the court reasoned that no registered voters of a local school
district are necessarily "qualified voters" who might be entitled to
constitutional voting rights.31 2 Nevertheless, the court did point out that
voters in New Jersey do have indirect control over charter school budgets
in that they are permitted to vote on local public school budgets, which
include the cost of charter school funding.
3 13
The two Arizona court cases also included issues involving federal
law. In the first case of Salt River Prima-Maricopa Indian Community
School v. Arizona (AZ-1), 23 P.2d 103 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001), the
plaintiffs, several charter schools designed to serve a Native-American
306. Id. at 373. It should be observed that the charter school regulatory scheme does
require the Commissioner to state reasons for denying a charter school application.
307. In re Patrick Douglas Charter Sch., No. A-4713-97TI at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1999).
308. Id. at *8.
309. Id.
310. Englewood, 727 A.2d at 50. The plaintiff school district in Patrick Douglas
made a similar claim, and the Appellate Division treated it in the same manner as set
forth in this case.
311. Id.
312. Id. (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964)) (observing that the
Constitution guarantees the right to vote to all "qualified voters").
313. Id. at 49.
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population, raised the question of whether a "deduct statute" was
constitutionally permissible.31 4 This type of statute specifies that funds
that would otherwise be given to a charter school to provide equalized
spending need not be given if equivalent funding is obtained from other
sources, such as the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA"). 315 The Arizona
Court of Appeals denied the plaintiffs challenge, finding that BIA-
supported charter schools had received the same if not more funding than
other charter schools. 3 16 Therefore, they could not demonstrate that the
Arizona Deduct Statute bore more heavily on them and could not
establish a constitutional violation of equal protection.3" 7
In the other Arizona case, Shelby School v. Arizona State Board of
Education (AZ-2), the plaintiff, a proposed conversion charter school,
also asserted an equal protection claim. 31 8 It challenged the authority of
the State Board of Education to conduct personal credit checks of
persons affiliated with its charter school application. 31 9 It alleged that
this action was discriminatory because the State Board did not subject
persons affiliated with other public schools to credit checks.320 In regard
to this claim, the court of appeals ruled against the school, finding that
charter schools constituted a distinct classification that was sufficiently
different from other public schools. 321 As such, the court reasoned,
charter schools required closer investigation of those persons in charge of
their operations.322 In regard to an unrelated claim, the court of appeals
rejected the plaintiffs alleged violation of due process, holding that a
charter applicant acquired no vested property interest, since, by virtue of
the charter school act, no entity possesses an entitlement to operate a
charter school.323
Additionally, the plaintiff alleged a violation of the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. Prior to applying for charter school
314. See Salt River Prima-Maricopa Indian Comm. Sch. v. Ariz., 23 P.3d 103 (Ariz.
2001).
315. The responsibility of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) is the administration
and management of lands held in trust by the United States for American Indians, Indian
tribes, and Alaska Natives.
316. Salt River, 23 P.3d at 106.
317. Id. at 106-07.
318. See Shelby Sch. v. Ariz. State Bd. of Educ., 962 P.2d 230 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
319. Id. at235.
320. Id. at 243.
321. Id.
322. The court stated, "[i]t is reasonable for charter schools to be classified differently
from non-charter public schools because of the different manner in which they are
formed and operated. Furthermore, because the directors and board members of charter
schools have more direct access to state funds than do employees of non-charter schools,
it is reasonable for the charter school classification to have financial requirements that
apply only to that class." Shelby, 962 P.2d at 243.
323. Id.
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status, the Shelby School had originally been established by the Church
324of Immortal Consciousness. The school asserted that the State Board's
investigation into the religious affiliations and lifestyles of its board
members impinged on their freedoms of religion and association and
right of privacy.32 5 The appellate court, however, held that the state's
investigation did not unduly burden the board members' constitutional
protections. 326 It found that the investigation was reasonably necessary
in order for the State Board to determine whether the proposed charter
school had actually fulfilled its obligation to become non-sectarian.3 27
D. Issues Regarding Standing
In many of the state court cases, including several previously
discussed, the courts were confronted with issues regarding the legal
requirement of standing. To resolve these procedural issues, the courts
were required to determine whether the party filing a complaint had the
requisite legal interest and relationship to the defendant to bring such an
action and, if it did, whether the charter school act or other legal grounds
precluded the party from doing so. Most of the state court decisions on
this question tended to be restrictive, thus denying the right of certain
parties to seek remedies for alleged grievances.
A New York appellate court, for example, ruled in Roosevelt (NY-
1) that a school district could not challenge the constitutionality of the
state's charter school enabling act because it lacked the capacity to sue
the state.328 Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in West
Chester Area School District (PA- I) that taxpayers could not intervene in
the appeal of a charter school denial, since only the charter applicant and
the local school board could be parties in such an action.3 29  The
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court also ruled in Brackbill (PA-2) that
taxpayers could not intervene in cases in which a charter school
application was approved. 330 Additionally, a Massachusetts court ruled
in Russo (MA-I) that a taxpayer, concerned about the potential effect of
324. An electronic search on the internet search engine Google reveals that this
organization is widely considered a cult. Trina Kamp, leader and founder of the church,
has claimed to speak for a 600 year old spirit.
325. See Shelby, 962 P.2d at 243.
326. Id.
327. The court found that subsection (E)(2) of the charter statute (ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 15-183) required such an investigation. Id.
328. See In the Matter of Bd. of Educ. of the Roosevelt Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Bd.
ofTrs. of the State Univ. ofN.Y., 723 N.Y.S.2d 262, 268 (2001).
329. See West Chester Area Sch. Dist. v. Collegium Charter Sch., 812 A.2d 1172,
1186 (Pa. 2002).
330. See Brackbill v. Ron Brown Charter Sch., 777 A. 2d 131, 139 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2001).
[Vol. 109: !
CHARTING THE COURT CHALLENGES
a proposed charter school on local traffic and parking, lacked standing to
sue because he could not demonstrate that he would suffer a specific
injury that fell within the scope of the charter school act.33'
The issue of standing also arose in the Colorado case of Academy of
Charter Schools (CO-l), in which one of the plaintiffs was an existing
charter school. 332 That school and its respective school association sued
the local school district to enforce provisions in their service agreement
and charter contract.333 The Colorado Supreme Court held that, although
the charter school was a part of and subordinate to the school district, it
still possessed the right to sue to seek enforcement of the service
agreement.334  Nevertheless, the court held that, pursuant to an
amendment of the charter school enabling act, the charter school lacked
standing in the state courts to resolve a dispute pertaining to the
governing provisions of its charter contract with the school district.335
The court held that, as amended, the charter school act required the
charter school to settle its claim by means of a local dispute resolution
336process or by an appeal, if necessary, to the State Board of Education.
E. Summary of Cases Decided by State Courts
My review and analysis of the of challenges to charter schools in
state courts during the first decade of their existence demonstrates that
such challenges have not proven to be a significant impediment to the
growth of the charter school movement. None of the state court
decisions-including five state supreme court decisions337-held that
their respective states' charter school enabling acts was
unconstitutional. 338 The courts held that such acts provided reasonable
safeguards, including sufficient public accountability (MI-1), appropriate
331. See Russo v. Reilly, 2001 WL 716883 at *1 (Mass. Super. 2001).
332. See Acad. of Charter Sch. v. Adams County Sch. Dist. No. 12, 32 P.3d 456
(Colo. 2001).
333. Id.
334. The court also held, however, that the school association, which consisted of
private citizens, lacked standing to enforce the contract for the benefit of the charter
school. The court pointed out that an action by the association was unnecessary, since
the charter school possessed standing, and thus could sue to protect its own contractual
interests.
335. The charter school claimed that the school district had attempted to impose new
requirements on its system of governance without first obtaining an amendment of the
charter.
336. See Acad. of Charter Sch., 32 P.3d at 462.
337. See cases cited supra, Part IV, sections A and B.
338. As previously noted, however, after the Lighthouse Charter School case was
remanded by the South Carolina Supreme Court, a circuit court judge subsequently found
a provision of the state's charter school enabling act (requiring the school to adhere to
racially identifiable criteria in its admission process) to be unconstitutional.
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allocation of control (CO-i) and adequate state supervision (UT-I and
CA-i), to withstand challenges alleging an improper delegation of
authority. Thus, so far, these courts have determined that one of the
central characteristics of charter schools, their relative freedom from
traditional regulations, is not problematic from a legal perspective.339
Most of the state cases that involved the interpretation and
application of charter school enabling acts construed the acts in favor of
charter school applicants. It should be observed that, unlike the situation
in some states (where only the state decides charter applications), 4 °
several states, such as Pennsylvania, authorize the local school district to
make the initial determination regarding a charter application. Should
the district deny an application, the applicant may then appeal the
decision to the state Board of Education. In many instances, including
all six Pennsylvania state court cases, the state Board overturned the
district's initial denials, basing its rationale on procedural reasons and/or
on determinations that the districts had not adequately justified their
decision-making.
When a district has chosen to appeal the state board's reversal in the
state court system, the district has usually lost. The courts have tended to
uphold the findings of the state board and, indirectly, the expansion of
the charter school movement. In those cases in which state courts have
ruled against charter applicants, the courts have also tended to uphold the
findings of the state board, but under those circumstances because the
state board has identified sufficient reasons to affirm the district's denial.
State courts in only a few cases (e.g., AZ-2 and NY-1) have ruled not to
uphold the findings of a state board or other state agency; in such cases
the courts have held that there has not been sufficient justification for the
findings and have thus remanded the cases for further review.
The state courts have also proven to be generally supportive of
charter schools on issues related to standing. The Colorado Supreme
Court (in CO-I) ruled that a charter school had standing to sue its local
school district to enforce contractual provisions, and several state courts
(e.g. in PA-2 and MA-1) ruled that taxpayers lacked standing to
challenge charter school approvals.34' In addition, a New York appellate
court ruled (in NY-1) that a school district lacked standing to challenge
the constitutionality of the state's charter school enabling act. Despite
339. It should be observed that several legal scholars have suggested that the
delegation of authority issue may prove legally troublesome for charter schools. See
supra, Kemerer, note 22; Hassel note 6; Turekian, note 8.
340. New Jersey, for example.
341. Conversely, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in West Chester Area Sch.
Dist. v. Collegium Charter Sch., that taxpayers also lacked standing to intervene in an
appeal of a charter school denial. See supra, note 329.
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these court rulings, however, charter school applicants in several other
states have encountered an insurmountable obstacle blocking their ability
to challenge a denial of their application: the charter school enabling act
simply prevents them from filing an appeal in the state courts.342
In those cases that included federal issues, the state courts have
again tended to be protective of their legislatively enacted charter school
programs. In one case, Salt River (AZ-1), the state court ruled that
Native American charter schools did not suffer a violation of equal
protection in the amount of state funding provided by the charter school
enabling act, even though it amounted to less than that provided to other
schools, since those schools had received comparable funding from the
federal government. 343 In another Arizona case, Shelby School (AZ-2),
the court found that the state could conduct financial background checks
on charter school officials without violating their rights of equal
protection and privacy.
In the case with the most significant national implications,
Lighthouse Charter School (SC-1), the South Carolina Supreme Court
ruled that a county school board had grounds to deny a charter school
application based, in part, on a provision in the charter school act
prohibiting the student body of the proposed school from deviating
significantly from the racial composition of the school district.344 In its
decision, the court acknowledged that an equal protection challenge
raised by the state attorney general contesting the racial composition
provision might have merit, but avoided ruling on the issue.345 Such a
challenge, which eventually led to a statutory amendment in South
Carolina,346 could trigger potentially serious repercussions for charter
school programs throughout the country. Like South Carolina, many
states-such as New Jersey347-have requirements aimed at thwarting
segregation in charter student enrollment. As of now, it is uncertain
whether such requirements can survive future equal protection
challenges. The answer may depend largely on the extent to which
courts construe them as mandatory quotas predicated on race.348
342. This is one of the reasons why there may not have been more state court
decisions. Unsuccessful charter school applicants in some states have had no legal
recourse for appeal once the local or state board has acted on their applications.
343. See Salt River Prima-Maricopa Indian Comm. Sch. v. Ariz, 23 P.3d 103, 108
(Ariz. 2001).
344. See Beaufort County Bd. ofEduc. v. Lighthouse Charter Sch. Comm, 516 S.E.2d
655 (S.C. 1999).
345. Id. at 661.
346. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-40-50 (2002).
347. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A-36A-16 (2003).
348. In the recent United States Supreme Court decision Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003), the Court, citing Justice Powell in the Bakke decision, held that that
decision "made clear ... [that] truly individualized consideration demands that race be
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Because most of the state court cases have involved decisions based
on their own state constitutions or interpretation and application of their
own charter school enabling acts, most of these cases should not have a
substantial legal impact on other states. With few exceptions, none of
them has seemed particularly surprising and, for purposes of potential
guidance to other states, seemed particularly persuasive. In a large
majority of the states in which litigation has occurred, the state courts
have consistently held that charter schools programs constitute a
legitimate manifestation of public policy and have thus tended to rule in
favor of charter schools. Nevertheless, there definitely have been a few
cases in other states, such as the Lighthouse Charter School case (SC-1),
to which educational policymakers and school law practitioners should
pay close attention.
V. Issues Involved in Challenges to Charter Schools in Federal Courts
A search of federal court cases involving charter schools as litigants
has disclosed eight such cases decided prior to 2002. As with the state
court cases, in my analysis of them I have opted to omit cases not
involving the operational status of charter schools, such as disputes
between a charter school and its vendors. 349 Three of these federal cases
were circuit court decisions:
Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481 ( 1 0th Cir. 1996);
Perry v. Milwaukee Public Schools, 12 Fed. Appx. 406, 2001 WL
690653 (7th Cir. 2001);
Omegbu v. Norquiest, 20 Fed. Appx. 561, 2001 WL 1231382 (7th
Cir. 2001).
The remaining five cases were district court decisions:
King v. McKillop, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (Dist. Ct. 2000);
Jones v. Sabis Educational Systems, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 868
(Dist. Ct. 1999);
Daugherty v. Vanguard Charter School Academy, 116 F. Supp.
2d 897 (W.D. Mich. 2000);
Porta v. Klagholz, 19 F. Supp. 2d 290 (D.N.J. 1998);
Berry v. School District of City of Benton Harbor, 56 F. Supp. 2d
used in a flexible, nonmechanical way." Id. at 336. It follows from this mandate that
universities cannot establish quotas for members of certain racial groups or put members
of those groups on separate admissions tracks. See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315-16. Nor
can universities insulate applicants who belong to certain racial or ethnic groups from the
competition for admission. Id. Universities can, however, consider race or ethnicity
more flexibly as a "plus" factor in the context of individualized consideration of each and
every applicant. Id.
349. For example, the list does not include Colo. Visionary Acad. v. Medtronic, Inc.,
194 F.R.D. 684 (D. Colo. 2000), a case that involved a dispute about the terms of sale of
property to a charter school.
[Vol. 109:1
CHARTING THE COURT CHALLENGES
866 (W.D. Mich. 1999).
Five of the cases, including each of the three circuit court decisions,
concerned alleged racial and other discriminatory practices. Two of the
cases (Daugherty and Porta) concerned alleged infringement of First
Amendment religious rights. The other case (King) concerned alleged
negligence by a charter school and one of its teachers. The issues are
discussed in corresponding categorical headings.
A. Issues Regarding Alleged Racial and Other Discriminatory
Practices
In the federal circuit court case of Villanueva, Latino parents
alleged that a school board's closing of a public elementary school and
its opening of charter school created a discriminatory impact on Latino
students, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 .35 The circuit court, however,
found that there was no discriminatory intent on the part of the school
district in its actions that would support an equal protection claim.35'
The court also found that the board's actions caused no discernable
negative impact on Latino students that would violate Title VI, which
was intended to prevent federally assisted programs from engaging in
practices that would produce disproportionate racial effects.352 In its
holding the circuit court noted that the Colorado charter school enabling
act expressly required charter schools to be open to any student in a
school district and to make enrollment decisions in a nondiscriminatory
manner.353  The court further noted that a primary purpose of the
enabling act was to allow communities to "create new, innovative and
more flexible ways of educating all children within the public school
system.,
354
One of the key elements in the circuit court's decision was its
finding that the charter school enabling act did not result in a suspect
classification of students, based on the fact that the newly created charter
schools were designed to be nondiscriminatory.355 Hence the court
determined that it could assess the act's effect using a rationale
relationship analysis rather than the more demanding strict scrutiny
analysis, which requires a compelling state interest to justify the
imposition of a disproportionate impact on a racially identifiable suspect
350. See Villanueva, 85 F.3d at 481.
351. Id. at 486.
352. Id. at 487.
353. Id. at 488.
354. Id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-102(3) (2003)).
355. Id.
2004]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
356classification. Applying the less difficult standard, the court
concluded that Colorado had a legitimate interest in encouraging
innovation in education, and that its charter school act was rationally
related to achieving that goal.35v
In the Michigan federal district court case of Berry, the issue was
whether a proposed charter school in a state-mandated desegregation
school district met the requirements necessary to qualify for state
funding.358 The district court ruled that Michigan could not authorize
state funding for the charter school without receiving satisfactory
information regarding the racial composition of the charter school's
projected student body.359 The court also ruled that the racial balance of
the school would have to be proportionate to the racial balance of the
entire school district. 360 As a means of verifying the requisite balance,
the charter school would have to submit to the local school district a list
of the names of students scheduled to attend the school for its review and
confirmation.361
In the Illinois district court case of Jones, a former Chicago charter
school principal and director sued the school and its officials, alleging
that their action in discharging him violated both federal and state law.362
The plaintiff asserted that he had been wrongfully discharged after
having written a memo objecting to purported discriminatory hiring
practices and improper treatment of disabled students.363 Among his
many complaints were allegations that the school had discriminated
against males, because it would not hire them in lower grades, and
discriminated against students with disabilities, because it had not
complied with IDEA requirements. 364  The federal district court,
however, found that the plaintiff had worked directly for Sabis
356. See supra, Part II, section B, for further explanation of the analysis used in
evaluating equal protection claims.
357. Villanueva, 85 F.3d at 488, (citing McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270
(1973)).
358. See Berry v. Sch. Dist. of Benton Harbor, 56 F. Supp. 2d 866, 868 (W.D. Mich.
1999).
359. Id. at 884.
360. It should be noted that this requirement of racial balance is somewhat similar to
the provision in the original South Carolina charter school enabling act, discussed above
in Lighthouse Charter School (SC-1), requiring charter schools not to deviate more than a
specified amount in their racial composition from the local school district. See supra text
accompanying notes 291-298. Such a requirement may raise the unsettled question of
whether the racial criterion constitutes a violation of equal protection.
361. Berry, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 885.
362. Jones v. Sabis Educ. Sys., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 868, 871 (D. 1I. 1999).
363. Id. at 872.
364. Id. See supra Part II and text accompanying notes 126-131, for explanation of
the IDEA requirements imposed by the federal government.
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Educational Systems and not as a public employee. 365 Because he had
not been employed in the public sector, the plaintiff could not pursue five
liability claims against the school and its officials based on (1) alleged
federal civil rights violations in the making and enforcing of contracts;
(2) an alleged civil rights conspiracy; (3) a potential 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claim; (4) a potential Title VII claim; or (5) alleged violations of certain
state-protected rights, such as protection from tortuous interference with
the contractual relationship between the charter school and the
plaintiff.
3 66
In the two Seventh Circuit Court decisions, Perry and Omegbu, the
court dismissed the plaintiffs' cases after failing to find merit in their
claims of alleged discriminatory or otherwise illegal actions. Both cases
involved the charter school program in the City of Milwaukee, and both
cases had been previously appealed unsuccessfully to the Eastern District
Court of Wisconsin. In Perry, the plaintiff had sought to establish the
Elimka Institute of Cognitive Intelligence, but the school district had
denied the charter school application.367  In reviewing the plaintiffs
claims for reversal, the circuit court simply found no cogent argument to
support his allegations.368  In Omegbu, two plaintiffs filed suit
contending that the statute enabling Milwaukee to create charter schools
violated the federal constitution, including both the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments.369 Once again, the circuit court found that the
plaintiffs presented no legal justification for their allegations, and
dismissed the case for failure to state a proper claim.
370
B. Issues Regarding Alleged Infringement on First Amendment
Religious Rights
In the Michigan federal district court case of Daugherty, the
plaintiffs alleged that a charter school had subjected their children to
various religious influences, thus creating a deprivation of their
constitutional rights as protected by the Establishment Clause. 37 1 To
pursue their claim the parents filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
which provides remedies for civil rights violations.372 They asserted that
365. Id. at 882.
366. Id. at 880-82.
367. Perry v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 12 Fed. Appx. 406 (7th Cir. 2001).
368. Id. at 407.
369. Omegbu v. Norquist, 20 Fed. Appx. 561 (7th Cir. 2001).
370. Id.
371. Daugherty v. Vanguard Charter Sch. Acad., 116 F. Supp. 2d 897, 903 (W.D.
Mich. 2000).
372. Similar to the plaintiffs in Council of Orgs. and Others for Educ. About
Parochiad v. Governor, 556 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1997), the parents in Daugherty also
unsuccessfully claimed that the actions of the charter school resulted in a violation of
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the charter school had engaged in the following objectionable activities:
it had authorized a parents' group, called Mom's Prayer Group, to use a
room in its facility to conduct prayer services during the school day; it
had allowed teachers and administrators to participate or endorse prayer
at the school; it had included religious content as part of its in-service
training for teachers and administrators; and it had endorsed the teaching
of morality from a religious viewpoint and permitted the teaching of
Creationism.
373
Before addressing these allegations, the district court determined
that the parents had standing to bring their claims, but only for the
purpose of obtaining redress for injuries that directly affected their
children.37 4  The court then held that the charter school's policy of
allowing groups to use one of its rooms to conduct prayer services did
not "establish" a religion.375 It further held that, absent any direct
evidence that students had knowledge of the prayer activities of school
employees, there were no grounds for plaintiffs to complain.376 Finally,
the court held that neither the school's policy of permitting community
groups to distribute religious information nor its utilization of a morality-
focused curriculum constituted violations of the First Amendment.377
In Porta v. Klagholz, the case decided by the United States District
Court of New Jersey, the plaintiff-a local taxpayer-sought a
declaratory judgment affirming that a charter schools located in a church
building violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. 378 As a
preliminary matter, the district court held that it could not issue a
declaratory judgment, since Article III of the United States Constitution
prohibited it from issuing advisory opinions.379  Regarding the
constitutional issue, the court held that under Agostini v. Felton380 the
plaintiff's claim failed because it did not establish that the operation of a
charter school in a church would (1) result in indoctrination of religious
Article 1, Section 4 of the Michigan Constitution, which prohibits the expenditure of state
funds for the support of any teacher of religion or religious institution. Daugherty, 116 F.
Supp. 2d at 903-04.
373. Id. at 907-17.
374. Id. at 905.
375. Id. at 909.
376. Id. at 905.
377. Id. at 911.
378. Porta v. Klagholz, 19 F. Supp. 2d 290, 293 (D.N.J. 1998).
379. Id. at 294. The defendant, the Commissioner of Education, also raised the issue
of whether the plaintiff lacked proper standing to bring such an action. Id. at 296. The
court determined that the plaintiff did have standing, finding that other similar cases had
been decided on the merits without addressing the issue of standing.
380. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). In Agostini, the United States Supreme
Court significantly relaxed the prior requirements of separation of church and state most
notably set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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tenets by the government; (2) cause a charter school to define students,
teachers or administrators on the basis of religion; or (3) lead to an
"excessive entanglement" of religion and state. 38' The court determined
that the charter school in question did not operate in an environment
where religious symbols and messages were prominently displayed and
that the school's founders had not chosen the church as a landlord
382because it was a religious organization. The court also determined that
the plaintiff had not shown that the school had discriminated on the basis
of religion.383 The court further observed that the charter school enabling
act did not prohibit the use of a church as a charter school facility,
provided the facility met requisite health and safety standards.
384
C. Issues Regarding Federal Tort Claims
In the Colorado federal district court case of King, a charter school
teacher, acting as a student advisor, took sixteen adolescents on an
overnight camping trip.385  During the trip a forest fire erupted,
presumably caused by an ember from a student-made campfire.386 The
damage was substantial and resulted in the destruction of several
homes.387 The damaged property owners sued the charter school as well
as its teacher.388 The United States Fire Service was also implicated as a
non-party at fault because it had allegedly failed to take appropriate
action to minimize the damage. 389 With respect to the charter school and
its teacher, the primary question was whether the teacher would receive
limited immunity under Colorado's Governmental Immunity Act
(CGIA).390 To resolve this matter, the federal district court first found
that the teacher was a governmental employee for purposes of the
CGIA.39 1 It then determined that the teacher's actions, including his
alleged failure to supervise his students adequately, did not take him
392outside the course and scope of his employment. Hence the court held
that he would be entitled to the damage limitation protections afforded
by the CGIA.393
381. Porta, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 301.
382. Id. at 299.
383. Id. at 303.
384. Id. at 302.
385. King v. McKillop, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1216 (D. Colo. 2000).
386. Id.
387. Id. at 1221.
388. Id. at 1217.
389. Id. at 1218.
390. Id. at 1219; see COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-10-101 (2003).
391. King, l12F. Supp. 2dat1221.
392. Id.
393. Id. By its interpretation of the CGIA, the court held that the teacher would be
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D. Summary of Cases Decided by Federal Courts
As with the charter school cases decided by state courts prior to
2002, most of the cases decided by federal courts involving charter
schools found in favor of charter schools, and none of the decisions has
apparently had a detrimental impact on the expansion of the charter
school movement. To date, the United States Supreme Court has not
made any rulings pertaining to the operation of charter schools,394 and the
three cases that circuit courts have decided have not produced major
consequences. None of the federal circuit court or district court cases
has proven to be a landmark decision that has or would necessarily
persuade other jurisdictions to subscribe to the rationale of its decision-
making.
In these federal cases plaintiffs have consistently failed in their
attempts to establish that state charter school programs have violated
constitutional provisions or other federal law. In Villanueva, for
example, the circuit court held that that the plaintiffs could not establish
an equal protection or Title VI claim against a school district, which the
court found had not intended to nor caused discrimination to Latino
students through the opening of a charter school.3 95 The results in these
cases suggest that future broad-based federal challenges to charter
schools are not likely to succeed, and therefore they will not likely alter
the status quo of charter school programs in sister states.
That is not to imply, of course, that plaintiffs may never ever be
able to prevail in challenges directed at the practices of individual charter
schools. Although, so far, the federal courts have deemed almost all
such cases without merit (e.g., Perry, Omegbu, Jones, Daugherty, and
Porta), plaintiffs should be able to succeed if they can prove specific
violations of constitutional or other federal provisions. 396 As have other
entitled to limited immunity even if his conduct were found to be willful and wanton. Id.
at 1220. The court also determined that the charter school, as another named defendant,
would also be entitled to CGIA protection. Id.
394. It should be noted, however, that in the highly publicized "voucher program"
case, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding Ohio's Pilot Project
Scholarship Program that provides tuition aid for students of low-income families
residing in Cleveland to attend participating religiously affiliated schools of their parents'
own choosing), the Supreme Court acknowledged that this school choice initiative also
enables students to attend "community schools" (an Ohio term for charter schools), in
addition to parochial and other private schools, magnet schools, and other public school
in adjacent school districts. Id. at 646. In the majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist
observed that "[diuring the 1999-2000 school year, there were 10 start-up community
schools in the Cleveland City School District with more than 1,900 students enrolled."
Id. at 647.
395. Supra note 350-51.
396. Among the requirements that charter schools must comply with are the
enumerated federal laws as set forth in the definitional section of the 1994 Strengthening
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public schools, charter schools may occasionally engage in various
discriminatory or other unlawful practices. 397 If that occurs, plaintiffs
may legitimately seek remedies in federal court. To the extent that
plaintiffs remain aggressive in pursuing such relief, they may cause
charter schools in all states to be more mindful of ensuring that they do
not infringe on federal rights. Should charter schools fail to take
precautionary measures, they may simply become more vulnerable to
needless litigation and exposure to greater liability.
and Improvement of Elementary and Secondary Schools Act, as amended by the Charter
Schools Expansion Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-278, 112 Stat. 2682. Included among
those enumerated laws are: (1) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (2004)) (pertaining to discrimination on the basis of race, color or national
origin); (2) Title IX of the Education Amendments of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (20
U.S.C. § 1681 (2004)) (pertaining to discrimination on the basis of gender); and
(3) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794), Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2004)), and Part B of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C. § 1411 (2004)) (pertaining to
discrimination on the basis of disabilities).
397. One means of gauging the potential scope of discriminatory practices occurring
in charter schools derives from an examination of the number and nature of complaints
filed with the United States Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights (OCR). At
my request, the OCR provided data regarding complaints against charter schools it had
received from 1998 through 2002, the first five years for which that office kept records
regarding such schools. Using computer-generated information, the OCR identified
charter school complaints it had received divided on the basis of applicable federal laws:
Title VI (for complaints relating to race); Title IX (for complaints relating to gender);
Section 504 (for complaints relating to students with disabilities); and "Multi" (for
complaints involving more than one of the other three types). Nationwide, the OCR
received the following complaints:
OCR CHARTER SCHOOL COMPLAINTS: 1998-2002:
1998: Title VI: 0 Title IX: 0 Section 504: 9 Multi: 0
1999: Title VI: 3 Title IX: 0 Section 504: 11 Multi: 4
2000: Title VI: 6 Title IX: 0 Section 504: 26 Multi: 3
2001: Title VI: 6 Title IX: 0 Section 504: 23 Multi: 4
2002: Title VI: 5 Title IX: 1 Section 504: 35 Multi: 8
If one uses these OCR complaints as a general indicator of potential problem areas
for charter schools, they demonstrate that most of the filings have involved alleged
discriminatory practices against students with disabilities. Of the 144 complaints filed
from 1998 through 2002, 113-or more than 78/o-have involved alleged Section 504
violations. The number and nature of OCR complaints stand in marked contrast to the
limited number of challenges pursued by means of court cases in general and the absence
of any cases against charter schools brought on behalf of students with disabilities.
Of course, OCR findings-as opposed to mere complaints-of discriminatory
practices would provide much more conclusive corroboration of potential violations of
federal law. Unfortunately, the extent of confirmed violations has not been public, due to
privacy concerns regarding the respective parties. Nevertheless, these complaints do
provide an indication that some charter schools may not be doing all they possibly can to
further the goals of federal law designed to promote equal educational opportunity,
especially for historically disadvantaged students.
2004]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
VI. Conclusion
It seems clear that the outcome of charter school cases decided in
state and federal courts have not served as a significant derailment to the
growth of the charter school movement. The state and federal courts
have shown almost unwavering constancy in rejecting the challenges
brought by school boards and other adversaries against the opening or
continued operation of charter schools. Most of the cases have involved
issues pertaining to specific state constitutions and the interpretation and
application of specific statewide enabling acts. Hence these cases have
afforded no precedence and only limited persuasive value outside of their
own jurisdictions.
In general, the decisions of state courts have demonstrated two
tendencies: (1) the state courts' inclination to uphold prior decisions of
their state boards of education; and (2) the state courts' inclination to
uphold their charter school enabling acts. By their actions, the state
courts have thus helped to sustain and promote the development of the
charter school movement and to lend support to the view that charter
schools represent a legitimate means of pursuing improvement in public
school systems.
As with the state court cases, the charter school cases decided by
federal courts have followed similar tendencies. In federal cases
plaintiffs have consistently proven unsuccessful in their attempts to
establish that state charter school programs have violated constitutional
provisions or other federal laws. The results of these cases suggest that
future broad-based federal challenges to charter schools will not have a
high likelihood of success and, therefore, will probably not alter the
status quo of most states' charter school programs.
Thus, apparently, the charter school movement has successfully
survived the initial legal challenges to its right of operation and
continued expansion during the first decade of its existence. The legal
battles, however, may be far from over. To the extent that the movement
continues to grow and leads to the creation of still more charter schools,
especially in districts with high concentrations of historically
disadvantaged students, the concern regarding the movement's fiscal
impact on traditional public schools will probably increase in
significance. This may likely produce further court challenges, regarding
fundamental issues of public school financing that the courts up to now
have tended to avoid. 398 Failure on the part of individual charter schools
398. See supra discussion in Part IV, section D. Issues of school finance, particularly
the adequacy of state financing of urban districts, have been some of the most
controversial areas of school law over the past two decades. See generally, ALEXANDER
AND ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 880-932.
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to comply with federal laws specifically designed to assist historically
disadvantaged students may also lead to additional court challenges,
especially students with disabilities.399
Yet, during their brief history, charter schools have obtained the
consistent backing of state and federal court systems in their legal battles
to open and remain in operation. Whether they provide the rich learning
environments for students that their proponents have predicted, of
course, is well beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, charter
schools have at least proven overwhelmingly successful in overcoming
court cases challenging their status as a legitimate component within the
public school framework.
399. See supra note 117 for indication for potential violations of federal law designed
to assist historically disadvantaged students, as derived from complaints filed with the
United States Departments of Education's Office of Civil Rights.
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